

**National REDD Policy Project
Tanzania**

End-of-project Review

Final Report

February 25th, 2014



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Acronyms and abbreviations

CCIAM	Climate Change Impacts, Adaptation and Mitigation programme
CCAP	Climate Change Action Plan
COP	Conference of the Parties
DFID	Department for International Development
DNA	Designated National Authority
ESMF	Environmental and Social Management Framework
FCPF	Forest Carbon Partnership Facility
GoT	Government of Tanzania
IRA	Institute for Resource Assessment
IUCN	International Union for the Conservation of Nature
MAFC	Ministry of Agriculture, Food security and Cooperatives
MJUMITA	Mtandaowa Jamiwa Usimamiziwa Misitu Tanzania (Community Forest Conservation Network of Tanzania)
MNRT	Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism
MoF	Ministry of Finance
MTR	Mid-Term Review
MRV	Monitoring, Reporting and Verification
NCCSC	National Climate Change Steering Committee
NCMC	National Carbon Monitoring Centre
NCCTC	National Climate Change Technical Committee
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
NRTF	National REDD+ Task Force
PFM	Participatory Forest Management
PMO-RALG	Prime Ministers Office – Regional Administration and Local Government
PO-PSM	Presidents Office – Public Service Management
REDD	Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
REDD SES	REDD Social and Environmental Standards
RNE	Royal Norwegian Embassy
SESA	Strategic Environmental and Social Assessment
SUA	Sokoine University of Agriculture (Morogoro)
TFCG	Tanzania Forest Conservation Group
TOR	Terms of Reference
TNRF	Tanzania Natural Resource Forum
TFS	Tanzania Forestry Service Agency
TWG	Technical Working Group
UDSM	University of Dar es Salaam
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UN-REDD	United Nations REDD Programme
USD	US Dollar
VPO	Vice Presidents Office

Executive summary

Background and introduction. This report summarises the findings, conclusions and recommendations of an end-of-project review of the National REDD Policy Project, funded by the Royal Norwegian Embassy. The review was conducted by a team of three consultants between December 2013 and January 2014. REDD is an acronym for Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation.

Project Relevance. The project design is clearly relevant and designed to contribute to the REDD+ readiness process in Tanzania and in accordance with the emerging United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) decisions on REDD+ and Tanzania's own climate change strategy. However, some of the project outputs are too ambitious and do not reflect the realities of moving forward with a complex and yet to be defined process such as REDD+ in Tanzania. Delivery of these outputs depends on longer and more complex government reforms and decision-making than was anticipated. The description of decision-making and roles of partners is not sufficiently clear in the design of the project document.

Project Effectiveness.

- **Strengthening of the REDD+ Secretariat:** The Institute of Resource Assessment (IRA) REDD+ Secretariat was strengthened and played an important facilitating role with regard to the REDD+ process. Challenges have been faced with balancing external facilitation with Government of Tanzania (GoT) decision-making and ownership, but overall the Secretariat has handled the job relatively well. The use of sub-contracts and consultancies has been an important part of the project and it has largely been effective. Adaptive management has been limited with only partial dialogue on strategic directions between the Secretariat and the sub-contractors. The project has ensured a reasonable level of coordination in the REDD+ process, but the Secretariat has not been able to provide effective overall oversight, prioritisation and guidance to the REDD+ process. Lots of valuable information has been produced, but information management has been ineffective with limited strategic communication of information. The handing over and finalising outputs have not been effectively addressed by the IRA REDD+ Secretariat.
- **Strengthening co-ordination mechanisms and processes:** The National REDD+ Task Force (NRTF) was expanded during this second phase of support to REDD+ readiness and this has broadened ownership of REDD+ across government. NRTF has been a relative effective instrument for guiding the REDD+ policy process. The Technical Working Groups (TWGs) have not been effective, and have not been given any clear mandate by the NRTF other than an occasional advisory function. Linkages between the NRTF and the official Tanzania delegation and negotiators prior to, and after, Conference of the Parties (COP) meetings have been poor. Important linkages from the NRTF to United Nations REDD Programme (UN-REDD) have been achieved but opportunities lost with regard to integration of UN-REDD outputs into the activities of the task force. Linkages and diffusion from representative of sector ministries back to their respective parent ministries has been low and additional work will be needed if mainstreaming is to take place effectively.
- **Consultations and awareness:** Consultation and awareness activities have been well implemented and delivered according to agreed targets and as a result national awareness on REDD+ has increased. Consultations undertaken across the country have improved the quality and ownership of the National REDD+ Strategy. The rather general nature of climate change and environmental conservation messages being promoted has limited effectiveness of the activities. Monitoring of consultation and awareness impacts has been limited and strategic development of awareness tools have not been fully realised. The website and other media have served as tools for sharing news, documents and views on REDD+ in Tanzania.

- **Information management and lesson learning:** Procurement delays resulted in this output beginning late. However the field dialogues held between pilot project staff, communities and NRTF members have been valuable. Lessons learned have yet to be fully captured and documented. Furthermore, many of the written outputs have yet to be publicly disseminated. The limited duration of this work has meant that the learning network is unlikely to be sustained into the future without additional external support.
- **Social and environmental safeguards:** Important progress has been made in building understanding about the relevance and application of REDD+ safeguards as well as in the development of a nationally endorsed set of social and environmental safeguards. Additional work is needed to operationalize safeguards and to establish a functional safeguard information system as required by UNFCCC. The Tanzanian safeguards will not satisfy World Bank operational policies and are therefore unlikely to meet requirements for accessing the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) Carbon Fund.
- **Preparation and finalisation of REDD+ Strategy:** The National REDD+ Strategy has been drafted, consulted, finalised and approved and as such represents a major achievement of the project. Mainstreaming of the REDD+ Strategy across different sectors is a challenge and will be most directly possible within the forestry sector under the participatory forest management programme. A number of unresolved issues remain in the REDD+ Strategy including carbon/tree tenure, conflicting sectoral legislation, benefit sharing and financing modalities, and the REDD+ Strategy might need to be adjusted as these issues are progressively agreed.
- **National Carbon Monitoring Centre (NCMC):** A consensus has been reached regarding the hosting and functions of the National Carbon Monitoring Centre and proposals regarding its costs, financing, staffing and role agreed. Recent progress in establishing NCMC at Sokoine University of Agriculture (SUA) has stalled following protracted negotiations between Vice Presidents Office (VPO) and Presidents Office-Public Service Management (PO-PSM). It is unclear when or how these negotiations will end.
- **REDD+ financing mechanism:** Very limited progress has been made in terms of agreeing on a REDD+ financing mechanism, this is largely due to factors beyond the control of the project, namely the uncertainty over the level of future REDD+ financing as well as on-going national level discussions between VPO, Ministry of Finance (MoF) and development partners on options for financing of climate change activities. The discussion on climate financing in Tanzania is unlikely to be resolved soon.
- **Engagement of public-private partnerships:** Two project proposals developed from two landscapes in Southern and Western Tanzania have been finalised. However, as pointed out during the mid term review, these proposals are seen as costly, unfocussed and insufficiently REDD+-related to merit funding by Royal Norwegian Embassy (RNE).

Project Efficiency. The project set-up in the Secretariat consisted of seven full-time staff including a manager and deputy manager from IRA. Secretariat costs have been high and as such do not represent value for money. The project staff have performed well but organisation of staff work and management roles has not been effectively implemented and as a consequence effectiveness of project implementation was hampered. Reporting, monitoring and document management by the Secretariat has been undertaken, but effectiveness has been rather limited. Risk management has been limited in the project and risks identified at project start have only been partially addressed, while others have negatively impacted the project. Financial management in the project has been satisfactory. Accounting procedures were only based on proper computerised accounting software during the last six months of the project. Procurement of sub-contractors in the project has been slow. Expenditures for meeting and travelling costs have been high and remained so to the end of the project. An estimated USD 1.1 million remains unspent at the end of the project.

Project Impacts. The project has managed to create ownership and understanding among key decision makers around REDD+ a subject which is new, complex and changing. The task force has

provided a useful framework to build cross-sectoral understanding and ownership within government. Concepts such as REDD+, Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV) and safeguards are relatively new to Tanzania. Furthermore, the project has increased awareness among the wider population of REDD+ and its implications, although in some cases this message has been distorted by journalists and politicians in ways that create false expectations. Positive and new links have been created between government and Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) around collaboration, piloting and exchange of experiences from the field. Furthermore, the project has made important progress towards establishing key building blocks in Tanzania, such as the REDD+ strategy, REDD+ safeguards and MRV systems.

Project Sustainability. Many of the structures established under the project (such as the REDD+ Secretariat and NRTF) are designed to deliver elements of REDD+ readiness and are by their nature not meant to be sustainable entities. Additional donor funding support will be needed to continue development on key readiness “building blocks” if they are to be functional sustainable entities.

Recommendations. Significant gaps remain if Tanzania is to become REDD+-ready by 2016 and qualify for funding under a global agreement from REDD+. This includes efforts to establish a functional MRV system and to produce a reference emission scenario, operationalization of safeguards (including establishing a safeguard information system) and creating a financial mechanism capable of accessing and disbursing REDD+ finances. The following recommendations are designed to inform future support from RNE to the REDD+ readiness process in Tanzania.

- ***Support to the national REDD+ secretariat and overall coordination:*** In order to better mainstream REDD+ into Tanzanian institutions and to sustain its future development, support should be provided to VPO, which has the legal and institutional mandate to lead and coordinate REDD+ issues. The support should also include focused facilitation of REDD+ processes through an efficient, compact unit, which will assume the functions of the REDD+ Secretariat and will be anchored in the VPO. The focussed support to a unit within the VPO will help spearhead continued development of the remaining key building blocks of REDD+, such as MRV, NCMC, Safeguards, and Financing. Support to NRTF should be continued. TWGs should be discontinued as no additional value is observed. Linkages between the NRTF and the National Climate Change Steering Committee (NCCSC) and National Climate Change Technical Committee (NCCTC) need to be strengthened ahead of an eventual institutional merger. If additional support is to be provided to assist with Tanzania’s participation in future COPs, efforts should be made to ensure greater linkages between the official delegation and the NRTF.
- ***Consultations, awareness creation, and lessons learning:*** Future support to REDD+ readiness in Tanzania should only have limited awareness and information activities for selected stakeholders on specific focus areas. Such activities should be tied to specific outputs and with well-targeted audience (such as safeguards communication, benefit sharing options, monitoring and reporting, and investment in sustainable forest management). Future support to disseminating REDD+ messages and lessons’ learned should be focussed on using the website and other useful, relevant web based platforms, which involve learning networks and other fora. Urgent efforts should be made to sustain the website before the May 2014 web-site hosting deadline is reached.
- ***Social and environmental safeguards:*** Subsequent support should be provided, to complete the safeguard process. This will involve the establishment of a functional safeguard information system capable of generating and disseminating reports based on the current status of key criteria and indicators defined within the safeguards.
- ***Mainstreaming and sector focus:*** Focus the support on a limited number of deliverables needed to complete the readiness process, and ensure a limit to the use of funds for open-ended REDD+ process support. Mainstreaming efforts should be focused on supporting sustainable forest management and especially participatory forest management in future REDD+ process support. Addressing the various drivers of deforestation within multiple sectors should be limited to provision of REDD+ related input to strategic sector policy development.

- ***NCMC and MRV:*** Provide interim financial support to SUA (perhaps integrated within the existing MRV project) to develop a national reference emission level/forest reference level for Tanzania, while supporting through outsourced service providers for stakeholders to develop key elements of a possible MRV system. This will include collating and synthesising data sources (including NAFORMA) to develop a national reference level as well as reference emission levels, using current methodological guidance from UNFCCC, as well as initiating work on minimum standards for Reporting and Verification. In the meantime monitor progress in the discussions between VPO and PO-PSM on NCMC until their conclusion.
- ***Financial mechanism and linkages to FCPF and Carbon Fund:*** No additional financial resources should be committed to pursuing design of the financial mechanism until discussions between government and development partners on broader climate financing mechanisms have been concluded satisfactorily, and a clearer understanding of international requirements for the receipt of REDD+ finances (such as the Carbon Fund) are known. It will be important to clarify Tanzania's position with the FCPF.

1. Introduction and background to review

1.1 Purpose of the review

The purpose of this end-of-project review is to review overall progress and impact to date, to draw out lessons and recommendations for future REDD+ activities in Tanzania, while also assessing the risks in the current REDD+ landscape. The review is expected to use the findings of the mid-term review (MTR) carried out in March 2013 as a starting point for the assignment. The Review should seek to draw out and consolidate the lessons to be gained from the activities supported by the Project. The review is designed to provide recommendations for future prioritization of support to meet the requirements for performance-based REDD+ financing at national level.

REDD is an effort to create a financial value for the carbon stored in forests, offering incentives for developing countries to reduce emissions from forested lands and invest in low-carbon paths to sustainable development. REDD was subsequently developed into REDD+, which goes beyond deforestation and forest degradation, and includes the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks.

The terms of reference for the review cover the following key evaluation criteria: relevance, impact, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability.

1.2 Methodology used in the review

The end-of-project review was conducted by a team of three members,¹ and in-country field work was conducted between 7th and 20th January, 2014. The evaluation mission was preceded by an inception phase in mid December 2013, to lay the foundation for the evaluation work in January 2014. The team used the following methods to gather information, formulate conclusions and develop recommendations:

- Collection and review of relevant literature (project reports, consultant studies, minutes of meetings as well as wider literature on REDD+ in Tanzania)
- Preparation of an inception report that provided a more detailed list of questions and methodology for the review
- Meetings and interviews with persons directly and indirectly involved in the project (See Annex 3 for a list of persons consulted). This included a half-day focal group discussion with selected members of the National REDD+ Task Force and Technical Working Group members.
- A short field visit to Kilosa to meet with and visit one of the well-performing REDD+ pilot projects, and to meet with district technical staff.
- A one day visit to Morogoro to meet with Sokoine University staff at the Faculty of Forestry and Nature Conservation, to discuss the plans for the National Carbon Monitoring Centre, as well as other Norwegian research initiatives related to REDD+ (such as the Climate Change Impacts, Adaptation and Mitigation programme (CCIAM) programme and MRV project)
- The presentation of key findings, conclusions and recommendations to staff at the Norwegian Embassy to get feedback and to discuss future ways forward
- Presentation of a draft report and incorporation of comments from stakeholders
- Production of a final review report.

It should be noted that the project implementer (IRA) at the time of the review had not submitted the final project reports and documentation to the Norwegian Embassy. A potential risk is that the final

¹Martin Enghoff (Team Leader), Tom Blomley (REDD specialist) and Kahana Lukumbuzya (Forestry Specialist)

reporting from the project implementer differs from what has been reported to date and which the end-review has based its findings on.

2. Background to the project

The National REDD Policy Project forms part of a wider programme of support to climate change between Norway and Tanzania. In April 2008, Norway and Tanzania signed a letter of Intent on a Climate Change Partnership with a focus on supporting REDD+ pilot activities in the field, capacity building, national strategy development and implementation. Support from the government of Norway to national REDD+ readiness has been provided through two phases of support. The first phase of support, from March 2009 to April 2011, had a budget of USD 2.4 million and specified eight outputs covering support to REDD+ pilot projects, as well as the establishment of co-ordination mechanisms for REDD+ at national level. In November 2010, the project was subjected to a mid term review which concluded that good progress had been made to date and that IRA had performed well as a neutral facilitator within the REDD+ development process. The review found participation in the REDD+ strategy formulation process had to be broadened to include other stakeholders and other sectors within government (such as finance, local government, agriculture, energy and others).

A second phase of support to the national REDD+ process was launched in October 2011 that built upon and extended the results gained during the first phase. A core element of this second phase of support was a broadening of the National REDD+ Task Force, in line with earlier review recommendations, as well the establishment of Technical Working Groups through which more detailed and focused discussions could be facilitated. Furthermore, the project identified a number of areas that could be outsourced to competent service providers with specific capacity and expertise in a particular field (such as communication, awareness raising, lessons learning and safeguard development). The project had a budget of USD 4.49 million with a project period of 24 months. The project had 8 outputs, presented below:

- National REDD+ Secretariat strengthened
- Mechanisms to coordinate, implement and monitor REDD+ processes strengthened
- National and local level consultation and awareness creation on REDD+ processes established and implemented
- REDD+ lessons learning networks established & information management strengthened
- Social and environmental safeguard processes for REDD+ established and implemented
- National REDD+ strategy finalized & action plan prepared and mainstreamed
- National Carbon Monitoring Centre and National REDD+ financing mechanism developed and operational
- Engagement of public, private and public – private partnerships

This project had a mid-term review (MTR) in April 2013 and a series of recommendations made regarding the conclusion of funding for the second phase. The project ended at the end of September 2013.

3. Relevance

3.1 Relevance of project design and its place in the Tanzanian REDD+ process

The project design was clearly relevant and designed to contribute to a central part of the REDD+ readiness process in Tanzania. The project was designed to address a number of very relevant national processes in order to make Tanzania REDD+ ready. The design was based on the

project being a 2nd phase and a follow-up to a previous 1st phase. The project design was aimed at ensuring readiness within 4.5 years (phase 1 and 2) by supporting a range of different processes that Tanzania had to complete to achieve readiness. Supporting REDD+ policy processes and the many different national level activities is considered to be relevant and much needed. At the time of design, the project was clearly relevant and the policy support process that the project was to promote was centrally placed in the Tanzanian REDD+ process, and it could not have been foreseen that the international REDD+ agreement and architecture were to be delayed for so long (and still pending). This delay has impacted the relevance of the project and with the benefit of hindsight, the relevance of the design is found to be more limited.

Some of the project outputs are too ambitiously designed and are related to REDD+ implementation after an international REDD+ agreement is in place. They depend on longer and more complex government procedures than expected. Generally, the project design has been found to be strong with important objectives, outputs and activities, although some of the outputs to be delivered are too ambitious and partly outside the direct mandate of the project implementing institution (IRA as Secretariat), which has a facilitator role vis a vis GoT. Specifically, output 5, 6 and 7 where it seems that the actual steps of *implementation* of safeguards (output 5) and *implementation* of REDD+ Strategy (output 6) and *operationalization* of Carbon Monitoring Centre and National REDD+ financing Mechanism (output 7) all are difficult to control by the direct project implementer represented by the Secretariat. Actual implementation of the Strategy and the Safeguards is more related to REDD+ implementation after the readiness phase has been completed and international REDD+ mechanism is operational. The final delivery of these outputs is under the mandate of GoT and dependent upon bureaucratic and political processes. The project document also under-estimates the timeframe for some of these government processes. The actual implementation, mainstreaming and operationalization related to these outputs should have been raised to the objective level and supported by clear assumptions of GoT ownership to the processes.

Description of decision-making and roles of partners was not sufficiently clear in the design of the project document. The relatively weak description in the project design of the division of roles between the Secretariat and the NRTF in terms of responsibility, decision-making and procurement has added to the challenges in terms of timely and smooth implementation of the project. Technical oversight, strategic decision-making and quality control as an input to the many important supported processes were not well defined in the project design. This has had important implications on the management of the project.

3.2 Relevance of project activities to GoT and donor priorities

The project has been relevant in supporting GoT commitment to REDD+ readiness, is in line with the Climate Change Strategy and it is consistent with selected aspects of sustainable natural resource, agriculture and energy strategies. The Tanzanian Government has committed itself to the process of preparing and getting ready for implementation of REDD+. The project has provided relevant support to this process. Whereas REDD+ is not specifically recognized in any government policies, the key strategies of REDD+ are consistent with Tanzanian policies related to natural resources management, agriculture and energy. Furthermore, the aims and outputs of the project are in conformity with the National Climate Change Strategy, where REDD+ is specifically mentioned. Although relevant in general for Tanzanian policies, the implementation of REDD+ might also conflict with some of the growth models that include significant land clearance for agricultural development (for example policies within the *Kilimo Kwanza* strategy and large scale initiatives such as SAGCOT).

The project relevance in relation to promoting broader goals of sustainable development and addressing multiple drivers of deforestation is of a more limited nature and has been overestimated. Focus on sustainable management of forest as the key activity in REDD+ has been partly lost in the project design. Project relevance in relation to the Tanzanian government's priorities related to sustainable development and the development of a "green economy" are of a

more limited nature. The intention of the project design responds to the need for integrating environmental concerns into rural development and poverty reduction and to support a process that addresses drivers of deforestation. As such, the design is found by the review team to have been too ambitious and not fully recognising the overly complex and broad nature of this process. It has not been designed with sufficient focus on the key agenda of sustainable forestry management within the forestry sector and did not recognise the role of participatory forest management as a prioritised investment area in the Mkukuta that addresses sustainable natural resource management as well as poverty reduction. The ability of REDD+ to influence and move broad and complex development agendas in several sectors has been overestimated and the importance of securing an international REDD+ agreement for driving the REDD+ processes in Tanzania has not been sufficiently internalised in the project document. In the overall development priorities of GoT, engagement in the REDD+ readiness is relevant but not given high priority, when compared to other areas.

The project is clearly relevant within the global Norwegian priority of promoting forest-based climate change mitigation and was designed to provide relevant input to the global REDD+ discourse. The support to REDD+ policy processes in Tanzania is of central relevance to the Norwegian global priority of promoting forest-based climate change mitigation and adaptation. The project was also relevant, although less directly so, in terms of sustainable development and poverty reduction priorities in line with Norwegian development cooperation policies. Furthermore, the intention in the project to address gender and rights of indigenous and forest dependent communities is of significant relevance in relation to Norwegian priorities. The project builds on globally accepted aspects of REDD+ debate and REDD+ readiness. It was designed to provide relevant input to the global discourse on REDD+ with measures included to ensure that findings and outcomes of the project feed into global discussions at international meetings on REDD+.

3.3 Relevance of institutional structures, stakeholders and mainstreaming

Relevant institutional structures and involvement of stakeholders have been part of the project design. Mainstreaming, addressing deforestation drivers, and involvement of private sector was given less attention in the design of the project. The project design has targeted the relevant sectors and stakeholders to be involved in the REDD+ policy process in Tanzania. Relevant ministries were involved and the focus on the importance of government ownership of the process was clearly relevant. The institutional structure with a REDD+ Secretariat and with NRTF to ensure cross-sectorial involvement was also a relevant aspect of the project design. The project design in terms of mainstreaming, which was seen as part of the cross-sectorial involvement in the REDD+ process, was found to be rather optimistic and did not take account of the significant challenges in terms of mainstreaming and addressing drivers in a sufficiently serious manner. Expecting that REDD+ would be given sufficient priority within key sectors, such that mainstreaming of REDD+ plans would take place without significant external support was also an unrealistic assumption. The involvement of the private sector was not clearly foreseen in the project design and as such, their involvement has been minimal.

3.4 Relevance of awareness, information, consultation and safeguards processes

Awareness, information and consultation activities are relevant in the readiness process. Monitoring the impact of these activities and ensuring feedback to activity implementation would have contributed further to their relevance. The project has been designed to undertake substantial awareness, information and consultation activities to support the REDD+ readiness process. These activities are generally found to be relevant in the readiness process in Tanzania. A rather rigid implementation of the awareness and outreach plan developed during phase one of the project and the implementation of these activities without sufficient impact monitoring and continuous feedback has reduced the relevance of these activities and promoted a somewhat mechanistic implementation of activities.

Communicating REDD+ is difficult, it is a complex theme where payment opportunities and environmental agenda take over the centre stage of the message and crowd out key messages related to sustainable forest management. Greater focus in communication would have increased relevance. The relevance of communicating REDD+ broadly needs to be understood in the light of communicating a complex issue where actual targets and implementation modalities are not known. Communication REDD+ as a sustainable development agenda is tricky and payment opportunities and an environmental agenda of conservation will easily be taking the centre stage of the message. The design could have taken this into consideration and ensured that the communication was using sustainable forest management as the key message, as this would have increased the relevance of the communication.

Safeguard establishment is a relevant task and in line with recent international decisions at UNFCCC. Each country developing a REDD+ program needs a country approach to safeguards that ensures that the social and environmental risks and opportunities of REDD+ are effectively addressed. Such an approach enables the country to promote and support the REDD+ safeguards listed in Annex 1 of the Cancun agreement (UNFCCC decision 1/CP.16 appendix 1) consistent with guidance on systems for providing information on how safeguards are addressed and respected, agreed in Durban (UNFCCC decision 2/CP.17). This includes the establishment of a safeguard information system (SIS). Support through Output 5 has allowed Tanzania to move towards the establishment of a comprehensive and country-lead approach to designing and establishing safeguards.

3.5 Relevance of project activities in relation to MRV and REDD+ financing mechanism

Activities supported under Output 7 related to MRV and financing are considered to be highly relevant. The UNFCCC decision 4/CP.15 requires countries to develop national forest reference emission level (REL) and/or forest reference level (RL) for REDD+. Furthermore, in the event of a global agreement on REDD+, a mechanism will be needed, at country level for accessing international financing and disbursing REDD+ funds to actors within Tanzania.

4. Effectiveness

4.1 Overall assessment of achievement of goal, purpose and outputs

The table below provides an overall assessment of the effectiveness of the project goal, purpose and outputs

Project Goal	Achievements
Ensure that Tanzania actively participates and benefits from global funding opportunities for ecosystem services in particular carbon related activities as a result of reduced carbon dioxide emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in the context of climate change	Tanzania is now in a better position to benefit from possible global funding opportunities for REDD+ or other climate change funding mechanism. In order to be REDD+ ready, there are still key areas that need to be focused on and further developed.
Project Purpose	Achievements
National REDD+ Strategy and implementation processes developed through the National REDD+ Task Force and other stakeholders	Strategy finalised and approved. The REDD+ process has been widely consultative with input from many stakeholders. Implementation processes have been partially developed. NRTF have played a central role in the processes.
Project Outputs	Achievements
Output 1: National REDD+ Secretariat	Secretariat was strengthened and has played an important

Strengthened	facilitation role. Continuity of secretariat facilitation in the further REDD+ readiness process is so far limited. Knowledge and information management have been undertaken. Lots of outputs produced. Strategic oversight and guidance has been limited and have not managed to ensure overall direction in REDD+ process
Output 2: Mechanisms to Coordinate, Implement and Monitor REDD+ processes strengthened	Overall, a better mechanism for coordinating, implementing and monitoring REDD+ process was created. Greater ownership and institutional collaboration was achieved. However, the achievements appear fragile, as many activities have ceased since external funding ended in September 2013.
Output 3: Awareness & Outreach plan on REDD+ issues implemented	Well implemented and service providers have delivered in accordance with agreed targets. Awareness on REDD+ has been increasing in Tanzania, but effectiveness of awareness, outreach and information activities have not been assessed. Participation from vulnerable groups limited
Output 4: REDD+ Lessons Learning Network established & Information Management Strengthened	Lesson learning network established and important field dialogues undertaken with good sharing of lessons. No space for issue-specific learning was created. Only nine months of activities implemented and the actual achievements in terms of robust network and continued sharing of lessons learned have been limited. There remains an urgent need to collect lessons learned more strategically and comprehensively in order for stakeholders to benefit from experiences gathered at different levels and between different REDD+ activities.
Output 5: Social and Environmental Safeguard processes for REDD+ established and implemented	National REDD+ Safeguards produced and approved, increasing ownership and understanding of safeguards processes at different levels. Major work still required on establishing functional safeguard information system, which informs policy processes with regard REDD+ readiness and implementation phases. Selective use of safeguards may impact eligibility of Tanzania under FCPF/Carbon Fund
Output 6: National REDD+ Strategy Finalized & Action Plan prepared and implemented	Strategy finalised and approved. However, Strategy implementation has only been limited. Actual implementation will first and foremost be after Tanzania has finalized the readiness process.
Output 7: National Carbon Monitoring Centre and REDD+ Financing Mechanism developed and operational	NCMC project document finalised and submitted to RNE, but limited progress in past 10 months due to differences of opinion between VPO-DoE, SUA and PO-PSM. Progress on financing mechanism very limited, but largely due to the complexity of broader discussions within Tanzania on carbon financing more generally
Output 8: Engagement of Public, Private and Public-Private partnerships (programme developed)	Activities under this output have not been able to achieve proper engagement of stakeholders and credible proposals for PPP at landscape level. Continuation of activities after MTR did not achieve any improvements in the output.

4.2 Output 1: Strengthening of Secretariat

The REDD+ Secretariat was strengthened and played an important facilitating role in the REDD+ process. The strengthening of the REDD+ Secretariat was done through the addition of dedicated project staff, trainings, infrastructure, and the payment of staff salaries. The project did build the capacity of the Secretariat to undertake knowledge and information management and the strengthening of the Secretariat was achieved. At end of project, the Secretariat had a strong,

enthusiastic and capable team with important understanding and insights into REDD+ processes and with an important and recognized role in facilitating the REDD+ process in Tanzania. Throughout the project period, the Secretariat was able to link stakeholders in the REDD+ process and have been able to support stakeholders to engage in the national and international REDD+ process. The Secretariat was important in the facilitation of the NRTF and the review finds that given the institutional differences in terms of the REDD+ process at project start, and in terms of ensuring progress in the process including addressing involvement of multiple stakeholders and sub-contractors, it was a good choice to have an external facilitator, outside line ministries, to drive the process forward.

Facilitation and guidance to the REDD+ process has included challenges of balancing a role as an external facilitator with building GoT decision-making and ownership. In sum the Secretariat has handled the job relatively well. The Secretariat being a facilitator and not part of government gives advantages in terms of independence and opportunities to promote effective implementation, but it also means that certain processes can only be facilitated to a certain point where after government decision-making and action is then needed. The job of being the facilitator of complex REDD+-readiness processes with strong demands and often conflicting messages from multiple sides was demanding and not easily defined. The Secretariat was caught in a difficult position of being responsible for deliverables, but also being a “hands-off” facilitator. Put simply, the REDD+ Secretariat was meant to move things forward but without driving things forward and leaving government behind. This has not been an easy role to play but the Secretariat undertook this well.

Use of sub-contracts and consultancies has been an important part of the project and it has largely been effective. Adaptive management has been limited with only partial dialogue on strategic directions between the Secretariat and the sub-contractors. A significant part of the budget of the project was used for sub-contracts and consultancies. Effectively, three outputs were outsourced to service providers. It is found to have been a good strategy to bring in external expertise in an open and transparent manner to complement the capacity of the Secretariat. In addition, a number of other consultancies have been contracted over the years. Internalizing, processing, communicating and making sure that findings from the outsourced contracts are used in a timely and strategic way has been a challenge within the project. Adaptive management based on dialogue with sub-contractor and partners have been limited. Provision of clear terms of reference, monitoring sub-contractor performance, and ensuring timeliness in the process has proven to be a difficult task that the Secretariat as facilitator did not managed sufficiently effectively. In some cases, there have been delays in procurement of service providers, which has reduced effectiveness.

The project has ensured a reasonable level of coordination in the REDD+ process, but the Secretariat has not been able to provide effective oversight, prioritisation and guidance in the REDD+ process. The Secretariat was tasked with the job of coordinating the flow of information and knowledge between policy processes, NGO pilot projects and on-going research in REDD+. The project ensured effective linkages to REDD+ pilot project, whereas linking to REDD+ research has been limited. In general, the Secretariat was performing an important coordination function between different stakeholders. However, the role of the Secretariat in synthesizing issues, providing oversight, prioritization and guidance to the REDD+ process and the work of the NRTF has not been effectively realized. The MTR recommendation on ensuring synthesizing, overview and overall lessons learned in the REDD+ process during the remaining time of the project was not realised. With further strategic guidance to the various processes from the Secretariat more momentum in some of the processes is likely to have been achieved.

Much valuable information has been produced, but information management has been ineffective with limited strategic communication of information. The Secretariat played a role with regard to information and knowledge management functions and in particular ensuring

information flows to the NRTF. The information and knowledge management has not been entirely effective in terms of internalizing the products of the contracted party into the work of the Secretariat and hence towards other external stakeholders. Although the work generally has been of good quality, the strategic use of the information has remained less effective.

Handing over and finalising outputs have not been effectively addressed by the IRA REDD+ Secretariat. Since the MTR, the Secretariat has worked on finalising some outputs, but has not fully focused their activities as per MTR recommendations. Despite the presence of an exit strategy, the question of ensuring a smooth hand-over of the project to VPO for further facilitation of the REDD+ process has not been effective. Delivery of final project outputs as per project agreement and securing of the outputs has not been addressed effectively by IRA.

An Exit Strategy document was of limited value since it only focused on options after the end of project and did not ensure and focus on phase-out activities within the given project period. The development of an Exit Strategy was outsourced to a consultant as part of a broad draw down contract. Despite the MTR recommendation that this contract be used to prioritize collection, synthesis and safeguarding of strategic lessons learned, a decision was made that with the limited amount of time left in the project focus would be placed on developing the exit strategy, although this decision does not appear to be clearly reflected in any NRTF minutes. The exit strategy document itself mainly presents different institutional and operational options for the period after 30th September 2013. It includes and recommends the option of a no-cost extension for one year of the REDD+ Secretariat at IRA. The exit strategy does acknowledge that the appropriate institutional home for REDD+ policy is the VPO but argues that a transition period is necessary while capacities are being built in VPO. The exit strategy was presented to stakeholders at a meeting on 21st June 2013 where the RNE was present and, according to the meeting report, agreement was reached on recommending for a no cost extension of one year. A similar recommendation was made at the 11th NRTF meeting of 19th July 2013, which did not involve the RNE. Interestingly, despite the recommendation of the NRTF that the minutes of the 11th meeting be shared with VPO for further action, no recommendation for a no-cost extension was made to the Norwegian Ambassador by the Permanent Secretary of VPO when these two met on 29th July 2013. No further actions were taken to effect this recommendation as RNE did not receive a formal written request for a no-cost extension of the project. The exit strategy did not provide in detail for any process to determine what information and equipment should be handed over by whom, and when, as part of a handover. In the end the document was of limited usefulness.

4.3 Output 2: Strengthening coordination mechanism and facilitation of REDD+ process

NRTF was expanded during the second phase of project support and resulted in greater ownership. NRTF team building was based on numerous meetings designed to foster participation, collective decision-making and supervision. The progress made in strengthening coordination mechanisms and facilitation of the REDD+ process by expanding the membership of the National REDD+ Task Force continued from March 2012 until the last meetings in September 2013. Indeed, prior to the year 2011, the NRTF had only consisted of representatives from the VPO, Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (MNRT) and the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar. Beginning in March 2012, NRTF membership also included the ministries responsible for Agriculture, Energy, Land, Local Government, Community & Gender, an additional representative from Zanzibar, as well as a Civil Society Organizations representative. Despite the successful expansion of the task force, representation from the Ministry of Finance and Private Sector Representatives was not achieved effectively. The lack of private sector participation was despite efforts made by the Kilombero Valley Teak Company (KVTC) to participate in REDD+ through community based forest management in villages adjacent to their plantations. An approach made by KVTC to RNE to be included in the pilot projects in 2011 did not yield any fruits. From October

2011 until March 2013 a total of nine meetings of the NRTF were held and during the last five months of the project the NRTF met at least eight more times. The fact that the NRTF maintained a consistent membership, with almost none of the usual turnover in persons attending meetings, resulted in a cohesive group that was determined and ultimately successful in reaching consensus on sometimes difficult decisions. Original mistrust of CSO opinions by the largely governmental membership gave way to greater openness and trust across the table. Ownership by government and CSOs appeared to be enhanced by the process. Any competition among the participating government agencies for project resources and authority were well contained, especially in the period of expanded NRTF membership. The available documents suggest that the issues deliberated during meetings included such topics as the REDD+ Strategy, recommendations from the Mid-Term-Review report, the fate of the NCMC, Safeguards, financing mechanisms, and the PPP proposals, amongst others.

Technical Working Groups were ineffectively utilized. Five Technical Working Groups (TWGs) were established under the project, in line with project documents and recommendations made prior to the project's initiation in October 2011. The 5 TWGs included at least 25 members who were expected to provide technical inputs in five key areas, namely Legal, Governance and Safeguards; Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV); Financial Mechanism (REDD+ Fund); Energy; and Agriculture; as deforestation drivers. Representation in the TWGs was drawn from a wider pool of institutions than the NRTF, which had overwhelming government domination. From October 2011 until September 2013 some of TWGs members met for a total of 15 times and although important contributions to the elaboration of the REDD+ Strategy and Action Plan were made, their effectiveness as free-standing "think-tanks" is questioned. This is because individual TWG meetings never took place, instead some TWGs members met as part of so called working meetings and workshops, usually with NRTF members present. Despite the recommendations of the Mid-Term-Review, the TWGs were convened on only four more occasions after March 2013. On one occasion, TWGs were convened, together with the NRTF, to discuss the PPP proposals and to receive the inception report of the Climate Finance consultants. The other three occasions for TWG involvement took place during the series of meetings from 17th – 20th September 2013 that signalled the end of the project, seemingly too late for any meaningful technical inputs to be incorporated into the project's deliverables. Combining NRTF and TWG meetings was certainly an efficient strategy in terms of cost and time spent in preparation. However, it is unclear why a cost effective, internet-based dialogue protocol between TWG members, and coordinated by the REDD+ Secretariat, could not have been developed to solicit inputs to key issues. Such a process may have led to even greater ownership and common understanding across Tanzania's diverse REDD+ community.

Communication between REDD+ Secretariat and RNE became increasingly inconsistent as time progressed. Despite having been regular participants of the NRTF prior to the year 2012, RNE representatives were not present from the 6th NRTF meeting, held on 24th May 2012, onwards. RNE often did not receive invitations to the NRTF meeting in a timely manner making it difficult for them to attend. Late invitations were an issue not only for the RNE but also affected the participation of other members as well. Surprisingly, the 10th NRTF meeting of 14th May 2013, with the agenda item to discuss recommendations from the Mid-Term-Review, did not include representatives from RNE, the TWGs or UN-REDD, although linkages to all of these institutions are referred to in the MTR report. However, RNE was invited to a number of meetings with broad stakeholder involvement, including a June 2013 stakeholder's meeting to discuss the Exit Strategy, where the RNE was present and active. Furthermore, on 3rd September 2013 a letter from RNE to the Director of IRA requesting that all documents from the two phases of the REDD Policy Projects be availed to VPO and themselves was not acted upon. Indeed, as of mid-February 2014 coinciding with the end of stakeholder comments period to the draft End-of-Project Review Report, RNE had still not received copies of all the final REDD Policy Project documents. The effectiveness of the REDD Policy project, and in particular a smooth exit strategy and possible handing over to a new secretariat, did

appear to suffer from an increased inconsistent communication between RNE, the NRTF and REDD+ Secretariat.

Linkages to the National Climate Change Steering Committee and COP delegation were weak. Linkages to the NCCSC and NCCTC appear rather limited to date but may be improving. The review team was not provided any document indicating that NRTF activities had been discussed in the NCCSC. The Mid-Term-Review team were informed by the REDD+ Secretariat that presentations had been made to the NCCSC on two occasions to explain REDD+ Strategy progress. Furthermore, the National Climate Change Strategy (NCCS) of March 2013 does make a definitive reference to REDD+ opportunities as part of Tanzania's intention to participate in climate mitigation initiatives and carbon markets and trade. At the sectoral level, REDD+ is specifically referred to as the forestry sectors mitigation strategy under the NCCS. However, the NCCS statement on mitigation generally, and REDD+ specifically, is rather weak, running for no more than one paragraph in an 80 page document. VPO Director of Environment is both the Chairman of the NRTF and the NCCTC and is the Secretary to the NCCSC, thereby providing an important link between these two processes. VPO expectations are that eventually the functions of the NRTF, itself a temporary organ, will be absorbed into the NCCTC. On the other hand, linkages backward and forwards between the REDD Policy Project and Tanzania's COP participation have been poor. There has been no proper documentation of COP preparatory and debriefing meetings between the REDD+ stakeholders and COP delegation, which ironically is also in the VPO Division of Environment. The effectiveness of the linkage between the NRTF, Tanzanian COP participants and the official Tanzania delegation through the Designated National Authority (DNA) has been limited.

The NRTF functioned as steering committee for the project and opportunities for integrating partner inputs/outputs remained limited. As was stated in the mid-term-review report the NRTF tended to function as a mixture of a project steering committee, specifically approving and controlling selected project activities, and as a national mechanism for integrating sectoral interests into the REDD+ policy process. This dual role of the NRTF had already been judged to have contributed to delays and inefficiencies by the MTR. The End-of-Project Review team found that very little effort was made to mitigate against these tendencies. The Terms of Reference (ToR) for the NRTF had envisioned a more advisory, guiding and inter-sectoral coordination function. The actual implementation of the NRTF was much more active in decision making and field supervision, resulting in low efficiency and leaving insufficient time for government NRTF members to attempt serious promotion of REDD+ to colleagues in their parent ministries. The NRTF had led to VPO and MNRT NRTF members better coordinating among themselves, but coordination from the NRTF members to the rest of their ministries remained inadequate. Beyond the one paragraph in the National Climate Change Strategy on REDD+ as part of climate change mitigation initiatives, the NRTF was not even successful in ensuring REDD+ was mentioned in the Tanzania Forestry Services Agency (TFS) Work Plan and Budget for 2012/2013. NRTF has not been sufficiently effective to overcome existing institutional barriers and the capture of externally supplied resources by project participants.

Based on the assessment of the achievements, effectiveness and importance of a secretariat role in coordination and facilitation of the REDD+ readiness process it is **recommended** that VPO should be recognized as the host agency for REDD+ policy support and this office should continue to provide coordination and leadership, however, linkages with NCCSC and NCCTC need to be strengthened ahead of an eventual merger. TWGs should be discontinued as no additional value is observed. VPO should be supported with focused facilitation through a small temporary unit of 2-3 staff (project hire) to address the remaining key building blocks of REDD+-readiness, after which REDD+ implementation will be addressed within more permanent institutional structures.

4.4 Output 3: Consultations and awareness creation

Consultation and awareness activities have been well implemented and delivered according to agreed targets. Awareness on REDD+ has increased. The rather general nature of climate change and environmental conservation messages being promoted has limited effectiveness of the activities. The activities under this output were sub-contracted to Tanzania Community Forest Network (MJUMITA) and Regalia Media Ltd with MJUMITA addressing the communication to communities and Regalia addressing the communication through various media at national level. These activities were implemented throughout the major part of the project and were building on work undertaken during the first phase. Although a delayed start up, the activities have largely been implemented according to plan and the agreed activities have been delivered. Much important work was invested in the awareness campaigns using different media and strategies and different levels. Important new media tools have been used and opportunities to reach out to decision makers and broader public have been taken. The activities are found to be well implemented and are contributing to improved awareness of REDD+ and related climate change issues in the country. Effectiveness of awareness campaigns has however been limited by the lack of clear messages on REDD+ and its link to sustainable forest management and the rather general nature of climate change and environmental conservation message that have dominated the campaigns.

Consultation processes for the REDD+ Strategy have ensured a relatively well-consulted Strategy. Still, actual impacts in terms of critically understanding relevant issues in the REDD+ Strategy and the REDD+ process have been limited. The consultation processes for the REDD+ Strategy has resulted in relatively wide participation across country. This is commendable and is assessed to have resulted in a relatively well-consulted Strategy. Still the consultations have been of quite a general nature seeking to promote REDD+ rather than having more focused thematic consultations with different affected target groups, where actual critical inputs to the REDD+ Strategy process could have been collected. Moreover, much of the country-wide processes for the Strategy have been heavily focused on local government staff with few NGO participants and with no real representation of forest dependent communities and indigenous peoples organisations. This has impacted the effectiveness of the consultation processes and has also meant that many issues remained largely unresolved in the strategy document, such as REDD+ financing, carbon rights and benefit sharing. Impact in terms of actual increased understanding and critically considering REDD+ has reportedly been somewhat limited, which also shows how difficult a task it is to ensure nationwide meaningful consultations for a national strategy.

Monitoring of consultation and awareness impacts has been limited and strategic development of awareness tools have not been fully realised. There have been other consultations and awareness activities being undertaken in Tanzania related to REDD+ and coordination with these activities have been attempted and been partially successful. A host of different information activities have been implemented and knowledge and awareness on REDD+ has increased, but effectiveness of awareness, outreach and information activities have not been assessed. The MTR recommendation on assessing the impact of various information activities has not been followed. With no robust impact monitoring of the many different information activities it has been difficult to establish what was working and what not. Consequently, establishing the effectiveness of the significant investment made in communications around REDD+ and getting a proper picture of awareness has been difficult. The review team finds that there has been a lack of strategic development and use of awareness tools. It should however, also be stressed that it is difficult to create awareness about REDD+ when targets are still vague and only partially known. The unclear international architecture on REDD+ contributes to this. Some lessons learning in relation to awareness and consultation done, but again this has been constrained by the lack of monitoring.

The REDD+ website has served as a tool for sharing news, documents and views on REDD+ in Tanzania. The website has only been partially effective in linking and sharing experience on REDD+ in Tanzania. The website developed and run under the project was relatively well

structured and with some relevant information. The process for updating and putting things on the website was slow and often not effective. Hence, much relevant material is still missing from the website. At the end of the project, the website has become effectively passive and the hosting of the website will only run to May 2014 after, which the website will disappear unless it is actively managed by a new REDD+ Secretariat or an other entity. The website did not prioritise material and it lacked overview of the important developments nationally and internationally. Limited lessons learning were presented apart from what was done by the NGOs. It never managed to be linked effectively to the lesson-learning network undertaken under Output 5. Effectiveness of the website as communication tool is questionable as it have had relatively few visits and with blog spots having very few comments, indicating limited interaction. Few stakeholders met claimed to actively use the website.

Based on the achievements, relevance and effectiveness of awareness and information activities, it is **recommended** that the future support to REDD+ readiness in Tanzania, should only have limited awareness and information activities for selected stakeholders on specific focus areas. Such activities should be tied to specific outputs directly relevant to the further readiness process (such as safeguards communication, benefit sharing options, monitoring and reporting, and investment in sustainable forest management) and with a clearly identified audience

4.5 Output 4: Information management and lessons learning

This output was outsourced to International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), it was delayed in starting because of concerns raised by TNRF about possible duplications. The contract was signed for 9 months instead of 24 months and culminated in documenting field dialogues at two sites for four pilot projects. This output was outsourced to IUCN under the title “Strengthening REDD+ Learning Networks and Information Management”. The actual outputs and activities of the assignment were more focussed on the process of developing and operationalizing a REDD+ Lessons Learning Network in Tanzania. Relatively less attention was given to improving information management or compiling lessons learned across REDD+ activities. The assignment itself was late in starting after concerns were raised by Tanzania Natural Resources Forum (TNRF) over duplication of efforts between IUCN, through a process awarded under the REDD Policy Project, and TNRF, through work awarded under alternate RNE funding. An agreed way forward was reached between the two organizations and activities began in October 2012. The IUCN approach was centred on field dialogues, in which NGO practitioners and CCIAM researchers were interviewed in four of the pilot project sites where subsequently lessons were documented. The field level dialogues were followed by a national dialogue with involvement of a broad range of stakeholders. TNRF has been documenting lessons based on REDD+ thematic areas. The two exercises are therefore distinguished by the differences in their approach and methodologies. The actual assignment effectively lasted for only 9 months, some 15 months less than originally designed. In addition to the concerns raised by TNRF, there were also delays introduced during the field dialogues because of the need to include the NRTF members in all visits to the pilot projects. NRTF members’ busy schedules became an impediment to smooth implementation of this assignment.

The main focus of IUCN was to establish a REDD+ Learning Network both nationally and regionally. Valuable lessons were drawn from the field dialogues. The IUCN work identified existing learning networks with relevance to REDD+. Thirteen existing networks were identified including the Tanzanian Civil Society for Climate Change (ForumCC); Tanzania Community Forest Network (MJUMITA); Tanzania Forest Working Group (TFWG) and Tanzania Natural Resources Forum (TNRF). The REDD+ Learning Network was expanded by adding the NRTF, CCIAM practitioners, and pastoralist organizations, amongst others. Training events with network members were undertaken on the use of web-based platforms, on introducing Participatory Adult Learners Methodology, and on developing a REDD+ network in the East Africa region. IUCN has also continued to share information on the progress of the REDD Policy Project by posting briefs on its global website. Notwithstanding the efforts to establish a learning network, which builds on existing networks, at the time of the End-of-Project Review the sustainability of the REDD+ Learning

Network appears fragile and will depend on the commitment of some of its partner members to keep it running. Based on the field dialogues held in Kilosa and Kondoa from 4th – 8th March 2013 and another set held in Shinyanga and Kigoma from 8th – 12th April 2013, valuable lessons were drawn around the themes of governance, benefit sharing, gender, land and carbon tenure, capacity building, drivers, MRV and sustainability. Although critically useful insights were derived from the field dialogues, the information was largely generated from anecdotal sources lacking any efforts to triangulate and assess according to a systematic methodology. Furthermore, feedback from lessons learning initiatives of IUCN and TNRF were not provided to the pilot projects on the ground, including the pilot projects visited for the field dialogues in Kilosa, Kondoa, Shinyanga and Kigoma.

Lessons learned were compiled through various processes but using the services of a call down contract to compile lessons more strategically was not implemented. Lessons learned are scattered, piecemeal and inaccessible to the general public. Lessons learning was listed as an important element in several project outputs, including the output to develop an Exit Strategy. Lessons-learning was equally recognized as important by the RNE-funded REDD+ Pilot projects. However, during the MTR it was not clear how the REDD Policy Project would collect, compile and synthesise lessons at the strategic, overall level. A sincere attempt to collect lessons' learned was made at the stakeholders coordination meeting of 19th September 2013, where the contracted service providers (IUCN, MJUMITA and Regalia), as well as the REDD+ Secretariat, the Pilot Projects and CCIAM all presented elements of lessons learned. The results of this exercise are captured in a bullet point form in the workshop report. The fact is that real lessons were learned and even remedial recommendations were made that stemmed from the IUCN reports and the final coordination workshop. Commendably, the project also produced a series of four policy briefs with useful information for sharing with policy makers and the general public. Despite these efforts, it remains unclear how the information will effectively feed into policy processes. Compiling and analysing of overall lessons from the two phases of the project and across the REDD+ landscape has never been properly achieved. As a result, lessons learned and best practices are currently scattered and piecemeal. Compounding the situation is the fact that REDD+ stakeholders have generated much useful information, which has to some extent been captured by the REDD+ Secretariat, however, the REDD+ Secretariat has not properly ensured the process of it being uploaded to the website and little post-December 2012 information is accessible to the general public.

Based on the achievements and effectiveness in supporting dissemination and lessons learning it is **recommended** that future support to disseminating REDD+ messages and lessons learned should be focussed on using the website and other useful, relevant web based platforms, which involve learning networks and other fora.

4.6 Output 5: Social and environmental safeguards

Important progress has been made in creating understanding about the relevance and application of REDD+ safeguards as well as in the development of a nationally endorsed set of social and environmental safeguards. Through the use of an external consultant, the project has facilitated the development of Tanzanian social and environmental safeguards. This was achieved through the execution of a methodology developed by the REDD+ Social and Environmental Standards (SES) initiative. The safeguards consist of 8 principles, 48 criteria and 107 indicators. A consultative process was implemented involving 7 zonal meetings across mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar, one meeting with forest dependent communities and indigenous peoples, the NRTF and finally a validation and approval workshop with the National Climate Change Steering Committee and National Climate Change Technical Committee. Overall, the process has been effective and has drawn on Tanzanian legal regimes as well as international REDD+ safeguard frameworks. The national consultant selected for this assignment has been capable and diligent. However, given the specific requirements of World Bank (which is going to be important for financing under the FCPF Carbon Fund), these safeguards will not be sufficient to satisfy operational safeguards under the

World Bank administered funds. The safeguards are ambitious and numerous. Prioritisation of key indicators will be needed, as some may be impractical to collect and assess, while others may be more relevant to REDD+ implementation rather than REDD+ readiness, so they will need to be sorted and prioritised accordingly. There has been limited assessment of existing data and monitoring systems that are operational in Tanzania (such as national household surveys and other national monitoring conducted through Tanzanian National Bureau of Statistics), and as such it is not known at this time what additional efforts (and costs) will be required to undertake assessment of the safeguards. The safeguards do not provide for an independent recourse mechanism (as is the case in other countries), which may impact upon the degree to which action will be taken when safeguards are infringed or triggered.

Additional work is needed to operationalize safeguards and to establish a functional safeguard information system as required by UNFCCC. In the 10-step process developed by the REDD Social and Environmental Standards (REDD SES) initiative, so far, Stage 6 has been completed. Implementation of the remaining four steps still remains to be done. This will include, producing a national monitoring report, establishing a national safeguards information system and feeding back the findings from safeguard monitoring into the development and implementation of REDD+ actions. Given that the output required that safeguards are both developed and implemented, this output is only partially achieved.

Based on the achievements and the importance of furthering the safeguards process it is **recommended** that subsequent support should be provided to the safeguard process to complete the operationalization of the safeguards and the establishment of a functional safeguard information system.

4.7 Output 6: Preparation and finalization of REDD+ strategy

The Strategy has been drafted, consulted, finalised and approved. Actual implementation will mainly be as part of REDD+ implementation following the readiness phase. The REDD+ Strategy has been prepared, consulted and finalised. It was approved in March 2013 by the National Climate Change Steering Committee, and was subsequently launched in Morogoro by two visiting Norwegian ministers. The REDD+ Strategy has been developed in a consultative manner and the finalization and approval is a major achievement under the strategy. No major development in relation to this output is reported since the MTR. The actual implementation of the strategy will predominantly be part of actual REDD+ implementation after the readiness process and after an international agreement on REDD+ is in place.

Mainstreaming of the REDD+ Strategy in the various sectors is a challenge and will be most directly possible within the forestry sector under participatory forest management. The expected mainstreaming of the REDD+ issues in sectors as foreseen in the Strategy is found to be challenge and difficult to really get attention to as long as there is no international agreement. And even with an agreement, effective mainstreaming will be competing with many other demands for mainstreaming and performance in the respective sectors. Mainstreaming might be most directly possible within the forestry sector, where REDD+ can facilitate investments into the existing programme on Participatory Forest Management (PFM). This is the government promoted programme that most directly relate to the issues within REDD+. First and foremost, REDD+ needs to be seen as one aspect of sustainable forest management, which holds the potential to reduce deforestation and forest degradation.

There remains a number of unresolved issues in the REDD+ Strategy including carbon/tree tenure, conflicting sectoral legislation, benefit sharing and financing modalities. Significant investments of time and resources have been made in both Phase I and Phase II, and as such, the REDD+ Strategy represents an important milestone, providing a framework for moving forward towards REDD+ readiness. It does not, however, clarify many of the longstanding and unresolved

issues that will need to be addressed for REDD+ to become effectively operational. This includes questions of carbon/tree tenure, legal and policy gaps (or overlaps) in sectoral legislation, benefit sharing mechanisms and financing modalities. As such, it will need to be seen as a living document that may require revision as issues become progressively resolved and agreed.

In light of the relevance, effectiveness and actual achievements related to mainstreaming of the REDD+ Strategy, it is **recommended** that mainstreaming efforts under the REDD+ Strategy are directed into tangible investment in forestry sector to ensure a focus on supporting sustainable forest management and especially participatory forest management in the future REDD+ process.

4.8 Output 7: Establishment of REDD+ institutions (NCCMC, Financing mechanism)

A consensus has been reached regarding the hosting and functions of the National Carbon Monitoring Centre and proposals regarding its costs, financing, staffing and role have been agreed. Following the development of proposals for the establishment of the National Carbon Monitoring Centre (NCCMC), a formal decision was taken by the VPO (following deliberations and advice from the NRTF) to establish the NCCMC at SUA, operating as an executive agency. This was officially communicated in writing by VPO in November 2012 and confirmed by the visit of the Norwegian Minister for International Development (former) in March 2013. A project document has been developed that outlines the necessary technical and financial inputs required to establish and operationalize the NCCMC in SUA. For this to be affected, the Norwegian Embassy requested a signed MoU between VPO and SUA that provides a basis for releasing funds to support establishment (inception) phase of the proposed support.

Recent progress in establishing NCCMC has stalled following protracted negotiations between VPO and Presidents Office-Public Service Management (PO-PSM). It is unclear when or how these negotiations will end. VPO requested approval from PO-PSM to go ahead with key steps required to form a new Executive agency, but this now appears to be moving into a lengthy discussion between the two ministries regarding the long list of requirements for executive agency establishment (framework document, business plan, strategic document, financing plan and others) – all of which were included as outputs of the proposed inception phase of Norwegian support to NCCMC. A statement from the Tanzanian president in mid 2013 expressing dissatisfaction with the performance of many executive agencies suggests that the political environment for establishing new agencies may be challenging. As such, the effectiveness of this activity has been limited, as much of the momentum that was created regarding NCCMC in the first part of 2013 appears now to waning.

Very limited progress has been made in achieving this sub-output largely due to factors beyond the control of the project, namely the uncertainty over the level of future financing under REDD+ as well as other on-going national level discussions between VPO, MoF and development partners on options for financing of climate change activities. Overall, there is no clear vision from either development partners or government regarding climate financing. Some development partners favour the establishment of a climate change fund of the type administered in Bangladesh or Rwanda. VPO appears to favour the establishment of the National Environmental Trust Fund, as stipulated in the Environmental Management Act of 2004. However, development partners have expressed concerns over this approach and have indicated that they are unlikely to disburse into this fund for climate change financing. An alternative approach now being pursued by World Bank, and increasingly Department for International Development (DFID), is to identify and finance climate-change investments to sectors (line ministries). This includes key sectors such as agriculture, water and others. IRA under the REDD Policy Project, engaged consultants to review options for REDD+ financing and proposed the establishment of the Tanzania National Climate Change Fund, which would be called for under the National Climate Change Strategy, and would be overseen by the National Climate Change Steering Committee.

The discussion on climate financing in Tanzania is unlikely to be resolved soon. Given the lack of government demand (in particular the Ministry of Finance) for a climate change fund, it is unlikely that sufficient political commitment will be generated at this point in time for the establishment of any free standing REDD+ fund, as funds for REDD+ are politically uncertain and likely to be less than those for climate change adaptation.

Based on the importance of MRV in the readiness process and the status of progress of the NCMC it is **recommended** to provide interim financial support to SUA (perhaps linked within the existing MRV project) to develop a national reference emission level/forest reference level for Tanzania. In the meantime monitor progress in the discussions between VPO and PO-PSM on NCMC until their conclusion. MRV must conform to the most current UNFCCC methodological guidance, include carbon accounting systems and account for leakage as well as reversals. Efforts should be focused on using existing data sources and MRV information.

Furthermore, based on the progress and achievement in terms of financial mechanism as stated above it is **recommended** that no additional financial resources should be committed to pursuing design of the financial mechanism until discussions between government and development partners on broader climate financing mechanisms have been concluded satisfactorily, and a clearer understanding of international requirements for the receipt of REDD+ finances (such as the Carbon Fund) are known.

4.9 Output 8: Engagement of public-private partnerships

This engagement of public-private partnerships had been delayed. The MTR had recommended that further development of the proposals should not be pursued, but it was decided to use resources to finalise the proposals. PPP proposals are finalised but are unlikely to be financed. This output was delayed significantly due to lengthy discussions between the NRTF and RNE where the NRTF were dissatisfied with the output as it was proposed in the project document for the 2nd phase of the REDD Policy Project. In the 5th NRTF meeting in May 2012, a Landscape Approach Concept Note was introduced as the guiding principle in drafting terms of reference, which were used to solicit project proposals for the output. Consultants were directed to prepare proposals for two zones, Mbeya and Kigoma, which were selected because these areas had NGO REDD+ pilot projects. The MTR of March – April 2013 had found that although the NRTF had directed that activities not be confined to district administrative boundaries, the final project proposals were not aligned to any landscape or ecosystem but rather were aligned to Regional administrative boundaries. Neither of the proposals was found to link field activities to REDD+ processes. Both proposals were budgeted at more than USD 7 million and were designed to last for 5 years. The MTR team concluded that the proposals did not provide a realistic basis for PPP or for attracting donor funds and recommended that given the need for prioritising efforts in the time available, Output 8 should not be given priority for the remaining period of project support.

The MTR recommendation was ignored and two NRTF meetings had also found the PPP proposals to be not REDD+-focussed and too ambitious. Final PPP proposal documents are not significantly different from the draft documents of February 2013. The MTR recommendation was ignored by the NRTF and Secretariat despite the fact that the PPP Landscape output was questioned at two NRTF meetings indicating the lack of REDD+ focus, their too high costs and their lack of institutional modalities for implementation. However, the PPP Landscape proposals had not been significantly improved despite time having been spent to discuss them at two separate NRTF meetings. The final documents have changed very little since February 2013. The revised Mbeya proposal does identify the miombo woodlands as a landscape and both proposals have added some additional REDD+ activities, but they remain overwhelmingly broad rural development projects with many non-REDD+ interventions and with very ambitious level of activities and funding requirements. Additional resources were used to finalise and discuss the proposals, but status remains that the proposals will not be implemented.

Based on the above, it is **recommended** that no additional funding should be allocated to these proposals in future REDD+ support from RNE.

4.10 Effectiveness of the interrelated support to the REDD+ process

Linkages between the National REDD Policy Project and other Norwegian support to climate change in Tanzania have been variable. The Norwegian Embassy is supporting a range of different, but complementary initiatives related to climate change in Tanzania. This includes the Climate Change Impacts, Adaptation and Mitigation programme (CCIAM), REDD+ pilot projects, the National REDD Policy project and the MRV Research project at SUA, which all are funded under the with REDD+ funds under the Letter of Intent framework between Norway and Tanzania. Linkages between the REDD+ pilot projects and the National REDD Policy project have been strong since the projects were launched in 2009 and 2010, and frequent exchanges between the NRTF and the pilot projects have continued during this second phase of funding. This has resulted in tangible impacts in the development of the national REDD+ strategy as well as other emerging discussions on benefit sharing and financing. Linkages between the National REDD Policy Project and the research projects (MRV and CCIAM) have however been relatively limited. While there has been good participation of CCIAM staff in key events (such as the REDD+ Strategy development, safeguards process and others), there has been relatively little flow of knowledge, findings and lessons from the CCIAM programme out to other stakeholders. This is partly due to the prevailing institutional culture within academic institutions to not communicate widely beyond peer academics as well as a more fundamental issue of timing. A significant time-lag can be expected between starting research and deriving useful and robust findings with the potential to inform policy development. As such, the linkages between CCIAM and other initiatives can only be realistically anticipated to bear fruit from mid 2014 onwards, when research findings are published. Useful lessons on the linkages between research, practice and policy can be gained from these experiences, which can be used in future programming of this nature.

Overall co-ordination and integration of REDD+ and climate change support among bilateral and multi-lateral development partners to Tanzania has been weak. The Norwegian Embassy is the acknowledged lead development partner on REDD+ in Tanzania, given the strong financial support provided to policy, pilots and research. Other bilateral development partners with an interest in climate change (notably DFID) have tended to focus more on adaptation as a result. UN-REDD+ provided financial support to REDD+ readiness between 2011 and 2013, covering aspects such as MRV, capacity development, governance and co-ordination as well as awareness and information. A final evaluation of the UN-REDD project in October 2013 was critical of overlap and duplication in the design of the project, given existing support from the Norwegian Embassy. However, more broadly the evaluation concluded that international support programmes have fundamentally failed to align and integrate into existing efforts as well as making deliberate efforts to harmonise objectives although regular coordination meetings were held in connection with work planning. One direct example of duplication of effort was pointed out by Regalia Media, which was asked by both UN-REDD and IRA to undertake training of journalists on mainland Tanzania. It was only through Regalia Media communicating to both parties to inform them of this overlap that an agreement was made to channel IRA funding to Zanzibar, to avoid double-funding. Donor co-ordination is formally undertaken through the medium of the development partner groups (of which the group for Environment, Natural Resources and Climate Change has the mandate to co-ordinate REDD+ efforts). However, poor leadership of the sub-group and declining interest from development partners active in the environment, natural resources and climate change sector has meant that this forum is becoming increasingly inefficient with regard to donor co-ordination efforts. As such, informal co-ordination between development partners working on forestry and climate change now takes place on a more informal at a case-by-case level.

Tanzania's official position regarding the FCPF is unclear and links to the National REDD+ policy process have been very limited. Tanzania requested to join the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) in 2008 and with support from the first phase of the National REDD Policy project, a R-PP was prepared and approved in 2010 at the FCPF Participants Committee. As a non-funded member of FCPF, Tanzania wished to benefit from the sharing of experiences through the FCPF Participants Committee, as well as being able to take advantage of future REDD+ financing through the FCPF Carbon Fund. Two staff from MNRT are currently contact persons in Tanzania for FCPF, one of whom is a member of the NRTF. It has not been possible to establish the exact participation of Tanzania in FCPF to date, and no plans are underway to develop a Social and Environmental Strategic Assessment (SESA), which is a requirement for future financial support under the FCPF Carbon Fund, nor have efforts been made to incorporate World Bank safeguards and operational policies into the Tanzania national safeguard document. Despite this, it was noted that regular progress updates from Tanzania are being posted on the FCPF website (most recently in October 2013).

4.11 Effectiveness of project, financial and risk management

The project set-up consisted of seven full-time staff including a manager and deputy manager from IRA. The project was managed by the REDD+ Secretariat at IRA who had signed a contract with the Royal Norwegian Embassy. IRA, through the REDD+ Secretariat, was responsible for all aspects of project management. The project is complex and requires strong management. Overall management was with the coordinator and day-to-day management was with the operations manager. Financial management was strengthened with the addition of a dedicated financial officer. There were seven full-time dedicated professional positions in the project. The coordinator and the operations manager were both staff of IRA and were allocated the positions in the project in agreement with IRA while the remaining staff were all specifically employed for the project only.

The project staff has overall performed well but organising of staff work and management roles have not been effectively implemented and as a consequence effectiveness of project implementation was hampered. There were ToRs for each staff member forming the basis for allocation and distribution of work responsibilities. Staff members were committed and project staff delivered long working hours for the project, undertaking important work. Leadership from IRA provided high-level access and leverage, which has been important for cross-sectorial co-ordination. The overstretching of senior management staff in the project from multiple demands related to this and other projects were highlighted during the first project phase as well as during the MTR of the second phase project. However, this problem continued to the very end of the project and was never really addressed. The multiple roles of the management including full-time engagement on this project, in other projects, as well as university related responsibilities limited opportunities for efficient delivery of project management, oversight and strategic decision-making. This has clearly hampered the effectiveness of project implementation.

Decision-making and facilitation of the project has been a demanding process and overall, has not been effectively allocated and addressed. Management of a range of different project activities was undertaken effectively, but there have also been significant delays in implementation, which can be attributed to the challenges in terms of institutional setting for the operation of the project as well as to the effectiveness of the management in addressing these challenges. The process of decision making between the NRTF and the Secretariat/management was demanding with a range of project management functions having to be included in meetings of the entire NRTF. This arrangement was not an effective use of time and resources by either the NRTF or the Secretariat.

Reporting and monitoring by the Secretariat has been undertaken, but effectiveness has been rather limited. Project progress reporting and work planning have been undertaken, but throughout both phases of project support, there have been a significant need for follow-up and further clarification on reports and work plans, which was very time consuming for both IRA and RNE staff. The use of milestones as indicators for performance-based payments was the intention in the project

design, but was not upheld throughout the project. Admittedly, several of these milestones were rather vague and only partially within the mandate of the Secretariat. Document and data management remained relatively weak within the project to the extent that at project closure, still all documents needed to be collected, organised and presented.

Risk management has been limited in the project. Risks identified at the project start have only been partially countered and some of the risks have negatively impacted the project. The project design identified a number of risks, but during project implementation, no continuous reporting and monitoring of risk was undertaken. Project reporting provided limited communication on status of output achievements and little real analysis were provided in terms of challenges, changes and trends. Below, an assessment undertaken by the review team of the status at end of project of the risks identified in the project agreement is provided. A discussion of future risks in the REDD+ readiness process can be found in section 7.5 of this report.

Risks identified in the project agreement	Status at end-of-project review (January 2014)
Risk of uncoordinated efforts within the REDD+ process. A key reason for having the project is to counter this	The risk was partly countered by the implementation of the project, but challenges in terms of coordination and different sectoral interest remains. Therefore the risk remains real and has impacted project progress.
Political and legal risks at the level of non-development of international REDD+ architecture. Risk of sectoral interest conflicts	The international framework has not been finalised. This risk impacted the value of the project, and the review found that the majority of the supported processes are only partially relevant without an international agreement. Risk of sectoral conflicts are still relevant but was been reduced with the implementation of the project.
Operational risk related to many actors and the quality of work and financial management	This risk was partially countered by the project, but problems of quality and oversight of the strategic use of inputs to the process were still real at the project end. The risk continues to impact the future of the REDD+ readiness process.
Risk of institutional barriers and institutional competition to real implementation of REDD+	The project addressed this risk through the establishment of the NRTF. Barriers to sound institutional division of REDD+ related work remains. Risk remains a threat when the actual mainstreaming of REDD+ within sectors will be undertaken.
Risk associated with gender and the non-involvement of women	Risk was countered by the project. Risk remains a real threat during actual implementation of REDD+ activities.
Risk of uncoordinated action among donor partners and among NGO partners	The project did not counter the risk of uncoordinated efforts among donor partners and only partially mitigated the risk of uncoordinated efforts among NGO partners.
The risk of REDD+ distorting other work related to climate change and forest management	This risk did manifest itself and especially work on sustainable forest management was not facilitated by the focus on REDD+. The project did not counter this risk.
Risk of limited participation in the REDD+ process of civil society organizations, forest-adjacent communities and private sector	The project attempted to reach out to many stakeholder groups, but was only partially able to ensure participation of civil society, private sector and forest adjacent communities.
Risk of governance failures within forestry and natural resource sector having negative impact on investor confidence in REDD+	The project did not address this risk and governance issues remain a major hindrance to future REDD+ implementation.

Financial management in the project has been satisfactory. Financial management in the project was undertaken in line with University of Dar es Salaam (UDSM) requirements and it appears to have been done effectively and in accordance with good financial management practises. Funds have been accounted for in line with agreed budgets. Project management ensured that expenditures to the extent possible were kept in check on the various budget lines. Financial reports have been provided. At the time of the end of project review, the final financial report still needed to be presented. Clean audits were provided. The support by the financial management advisers to the project contributed to

addressing some of the financial management activities by the project.

Accounting procedures were only based on computerised accounting software during the last six months of the project. Procurement of sub-contractors in the project has been slow. The necessity of computerized accounting software rather than Excel were highlighted since Phase I. Following the MTR, the actual implementation of UDSM e-accounting system called “VoteBook” has been undertaken, and reportedly it was running smoothly. Procurement of the various sub-contractors was a very lengthy process involving the Secretariat, NRE and the NRTF. The process could have been shortened significantly if clearer initial agreements had been developed and agreed by all parties and adequate oversight been given to the process.

Expenditures for meeting and travelling costs have been high and remained so to the end of the project. Being a policy support process that required significant consultations and involvement of stakeholders in the policy process, and that promoted learning and exchange between field and national level, it is to be expected that costs associated with meeting and travel are high. Although it was required in the project document that the project showed a decline in meeting and travel costs in order to improve sustainability at project end, this has not taken place.

An estimated USD 1.1 million remains unspent in the project. The budget for the project was USD 4.4 million for the two years. Based on draft financial reports where several costs still need to be included, the total expenditure for the project is estimated to be around USD 3.3 million. Annex 1 provides an overview of the expenditures of the project.

5. Efficiency

5.1 Efficiency of project management, implementation and delivery

Total expenditures of the project to support national REDD+ readiness are high. The project under review has had a total expenditure of around USD 3.3 million. Combined with the previous phase one budget, the duration has been 4.5 years and the total cost of around USD 5.7 million. The final accounts were not available at the period of the end-of-project review, so the figures are approximate and are based on a draft financial report, where a number of entries were still to be incorporated. The sad and unexpected death of the project accountant has made the closing of the books a longer and more difficult process than expected. The costs involved in the readiness support are considered to be high and if combined with funds utilized under UN-REDD for readiness in Tanzania, they are indeed very high compared to other REDD+ readiness processes in other countries.

Efficiency in policy support processes has been relatively limited and impacted negatively by an open-ended policy process with no clear prioritisation and deadlines and no international agreed frameworks to work within. The project has been supporting policy processes and activities emphasized a facilitation role. It is notoriously difficult to get high levels of efficiency in support to such complex policy processes. The availability of adequate project funding, coupled with the lack of a global agreement on REDD+ has meant that deadlines and deliverables have not been urgently prioritised. The use of project funds for meeting and travel costs constituted a very high percentage of the total project expenses. Without a finite and well-defined budgetary amount and timeframe available for facilitation of policy processes there appears to be a risk of slow progress. The continued delay in getting an international REDD+ agreement and lack of clarity in how REDD+ will be implemented internationally have impacted the efficiency in the implementation of the project. This has clearly made it more difficult to focus, draw attention to, and to provide timely delivery of the various outputs.

Running costs have been high and continued adding up even if deliverables were delayed. IRA was an important and recognised institution with a recognised convening capacity. By using IRA as a secretariat and neutral facilitator, the project ensured a widely accepted credibility in support of the REDD+ readiness process. However, the way in which the project was set up with high

infrastructure, operational and fixed budgeted running costs through the Secretariat meant that a relatively high percentage of the total budget went on these support functions. Approximately USD 1.3 million (or around 40% of the total budget) went into covering running costs at the Secretariat. This high level of expenditure is partly a function of having fixed running costs that, with delays in delivery of project outputs, increased proportionally to the total expenditures. Hence, efficiency decreased. Since MTR, no substantial steps have been taken to increase efficiency and running costs as well as meeting costs remained high.

Many studies to support the readiness process have been undertaken by consultants, but the quality has been uneven, with several studies not being of sufficient quality. Use of consultants to undertake studies have been widespread in the project. The review finds that several of the studies are not of an acceptable quality (given their cost) and do not provide adequate guidance and advice needed for the development of the REDD+ process in Tanzania. While the project should be commended for working with national consultants (which does increase buy-in and acceptability of findings, while ensuring that recommendations are grounded in local realities), the heavy reliance on university professors has meant that outputs have been of a very mixed quality. In some cases, there has been a failure to fully appreciate the emerging international discussions and debates within REDD+, and the studies would have benefitted from international inputs.

Based on the above assessment of efficiency and the need to complete the readiness process it is **recommended** to focus on limited number of deliverables needed to complete the readiness process, and ensure limit in use of funds for open-ended REDD+ process support.

5.2 Efficiency of institutional structures and modalities for REDD+ readiness

The REDD+ Policy process was multi-sectoral and resulted in government ownership. However, the heavy consultation and supervisory schedule of the NRTF was both expensive and time consuming. The REDD Policy Project was instrumental in creating and facilitating three structures, which were tied to institutions related to REDD+ Strategy development. The three structures are the National REDD+ Task Force, The REDD+ Secretariat and the Technical Working Groups, of which five were created. All of these structures are recognized to be temporary project-specific entities meant to facilitate a process of Tanzania's REDD+ readiness. There exists widespread consensus that the existence of the NRTF and the facilitation by the Secretariat has led to an accelerated and effective strategy formulation process. There is also consensus that the temporary structures allowed a mediation of the competition between MNRT and VPO, and that government ownership of the REDD+ process was enhanced as compared to a more technical advisory driven process, as seen in other countries. However, the process of coordinating, consultative and steering meetings can hardly be classified as efficient in terms of costs, personnel and time spent in preparations for meetings. The involvement of the NRTF in monitoring pilot projects in the field, participating in the field dialogues and accompanying the zonal consultations, was costly. In combination, the NRTF and TWGs met on no less than 20 distinct occasions over the last two years since October 2011. Despite the heavy workload on the Secretariat and the busy meeting schedule of the NRTF there is no indication that REDD+ readiness is well mainstreamed into permanent structures such as the NCCSC, NCCTC and into the various relevant ministries. It is important to also remember that permanent REDD+ structures such as the NCMC and the REDD+ Financing Mechanism have not as yet been established.

5.3 Efficiency of awareness, information and capacity development

Efficiency in awareness raising and information activities was relatively good. Nationwide consultations were needed but were only moderately efficient. The project utilised significant resources on awareness, information and capacity development. The activities on awareness and information were outsourced to sub-contractors and they have been efficient in implementing the activities. The focus of activities and feedback loops from monitoring of actual impacts on awareness would likely have led to higher efficiency in implementation of activities. The use of media for the

awareness campaigns is considered to be efficient in getting out to a broad range of people. The consultations undertaken in the project have been needed, focus and preparation in the consultation activities was found to be a challenge and the actual outreach of such consultations is after all not found to be very significant, and efficiency is moderate in undertaking this.

Capacity development has ensured increased knowledge among stakeholders. NRTF capacity has been developed but this has been relatively costly and not sufficiently effective. Capacity development related to REDD+ has taken place as part of the awareness and information activities, but specifically capacity building has been directed at the NRTF in the form of participation in a long range of NRTF meetings. Members of NRTF now know a lot more about REDD+, but there has been changes in task force members and feedback from task force members to parent institutions have been limited. Capacity goals were not set for the NRTF and considering the amount of funds spent for NRTF capacity development it is not assessed as being particularly efficient.

5.4 Assessment of outputs against expenditure and value for money

The overall assessment of the project is that it provided key support to the REDD+ readiness process but that it only partially provided value for money. Overall assessment of efficiency shows that implementation under several outputs provides good value for money, but it also depicts that implementation of a number of outputs is considered to be poor or relatively poor value for money.

Project Outputs	Cost in USD (<i>estimates</i>)	Efficiency and value for money assessment
Output 1: National REDD+ Secretariat Strengthened (IRA including institutional overhead IRA)	1,427,000	The total running of the Secretariat at around USD 1.3 million – it constitutes around 40% of total budget. This is considered to be relatively expensive and a result of many fixed running costs. It is considered to be relatively poor value for money.
Output 2: Mechanisms to Coordinate, Implement and Monitor REDD+ processes strengthened	588,000	Supporting the policy processes and the stakeholders has been undertaken and has created government ownership, but it is also a lengthy process with many costs. Provides acceptable value for money. It is expensive but creates trade-offs with ownership of the process.
Output 3: Awareness & Outreach plan on REDD+ issues implemented	299,000	Activities were timely and the planned activities implemented with positive outcomes. Provided good value for money.
Output 4: REDD+ Lessons Learned Network established & Information Management Strengthened	119,000	Activities started very late and therefore have limited sustainability, field dialogues important. Value for money relatively low.
Output 5: Social and Environmental Safeguard processes for REDD+ established and implemented	328,000	Well implemented and provided good value for money. Total cost is high but significant capacity building and awareness was needed in advance to ensure participation and engagement
Output 6: National REDD+ Strategy Finalized & Action Plan prepared and implemented	490,000	The output has been achieved in terms of the Strategy and Action plan being prepared. Actual implementation will follow during the readiness process. Provided relatively good value for money.
Output 7: National Carbon Monitoring Centre and REDD+ Financing Mechanism developed and operational	27,000	Work had been limited in this output, so expenses have been limited. Still, given the long delays it is found that the value for money in this output was limited.
Output 8: Engagement of Public, Private and Public-	61,000	The work associated with the output was seriously delayed and the products did not provide a realistic background for

6. Impact

6.1 Impact on institutions, coordination and capacity

The REDD+ Policy process has mitigated inter-ministerial competition, increased trust towards CSOs and ensured outsourcing of relevant services to competent service providers. The impact of the REDD Policy Project has been largely a positive one with regards to coordination and capacity development amongst partner institutions. As stated earlier, the multi-disciplinary NRTF composition, combined with the facilitation by the neutrally located REDD+ Secretariat, were key aspects that mitigated conflicts that had existed between MNRT and VPO at the outset of the first phase of the project. The REDD Policy Project had also allowed a more realistic understanding of government's own capacities and hence the need to outsource key elements of the REDD+ formulation to service providers or external institutions. Such examples include the agreement to allow the NCMC to be hosted at SUA, or the outsourcing of the sensitive issue of safeguards to a third party outside government. The adoption of the NRTF has also led to improved relationships between CSOs and its government members. The project has also contributed to the increased knowledge and understanding of key players on REDD+ concepts and developments. Capacity to participate in the REDD+ process has increased among the NRTF and related stakeholders, but it has not been the deliberate goal of the REDD Policy Project to build government capacity to implement REDD+.

VPOs mandate to coordinate REDD+ is agreed by all, however, capacities remain low, institutional behaviour is unchanged and private sector is uninvolved. As a result of the project there is a widespread consensus among NRTF members regarding the legal mandate of DoE in the VPO for co-ordinating issues of climate change, including REDD+. The mandate of VPO over REDD+, which is essentially a forestry initiative, was contested in the beginning. It is unclear whether the acceptance of VPO's mandate has been translated into increased capacity within VPO. It is currently too early to say whether this consensus will continue into the future. Any impact in terms of changed institutional behaviour or increased budgetary investments is so far absent. Unfortunately, the involvement of the Ministry of Finance and the private sector in REDD+ discussions at national level still remains as a significant gap.

6.2 Impact on strategies and policies

The REDD+ Strategy is approved and REDD+ is referred to in the NCCS but not in the TFS Workplan and Budget. The National REDD+ Strategy was successfully formulated in a consultative and open process, leading to eventual endorsement by the National Climate Change Steering Committee and cabinet approval in March 2013. Formulation and approval of the REDD+ Strategy went in parallel with the formulation and approval of the National Climate Change Strategy, also approved in March 2013. REDD+ is referred to substantially in the NCCS under the forestry sector's mitigation strategy. Despite the inclusion of REDD+ in forestry's strategy under the NCCS, the workplan and budget of TFS are silent on REDD+, only referring to goals to expand PFM in the country. Although the implementation and expansion of PFM is an essential strategy in REDD+ implementation, it remains to be seen whether a new Forest Policy and Forest Programme document, which are currently being developed, will be more REDD+ friendly.

The Ministry of Agriculture is interested in links with REDD+ as part of their Climate Change Action Plan formulation. As part of the NCCS each sector is expected to prepare a sector action plan. The Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives (MAFC) is one of the few

ministries that has advanced in this regard. MAFC is currently developing a Climate Change Action Plan (CCAP) for the Agriculture sector, with technical assistance provided by the World Bank in collaboration with local academic institutions such as SUA and UDSM. In connection with the agricultural CCAP, contacts have been deliberately made with the NRTF and REDD+ Secretariat in order to both, learn from the REDD+ Action Plan process, and also to contribute to the REDD+ objective of dealing with drivers of deforestation. The CCAP of agriculture is expected to be ready by March 2014 and only time will tell if REDD+ will be included in a meaningful manner in this document.

6.3 Impact on awareness and knowledge

Impacts on awareness and knowledge of REDD+ are positive and consultations have been applied broadly across Tanzania. Actual outreach and level of awareness have been constrained due to complexity of subject and difficulties in focusing messages. The project has through awareness campaigns, knowledge dissemination and public consultations created important impact on general awareness and interest in REDD+. This is a valuable part of the readiness process. The impact in terms of awareness and knowledge is mainly of a general nature related to increased awareness of climate change and environmental conservation. Communicating REDD+ has been challenged by its complexity as well as lack of clear targets and modalities. Linking effectively to awareness and information related to government's own participatory forest management programme has not been sufficiently strong. Impacts of communication work have not been monitored so they are difficult to assess. In consultations on the REDD+ Strategy and REDD+ Safeguards a wide number of people have been reached and they have been able to engage in formulating public policy and processes. The impact of this broad based consultation has been to achieve a national consensus on some of the key elements of a national REDD+ strategy. As expected, national outreach is a daunting task, and therefore the level of involvement of different stakeholders in the consultations has in reality been somewhat limited compared to the ideal of broad-based involvement. Involvement of representatives of forest-dependent communities and indigenous peoples has been limited in the consultations, but do seem to have increased during the Safeguards consultation process.

6.4 Impact on safeguards

There is growing ownership and appreciation of REDD+ safeguards. REDD+ Safeguards are an entirely new concept in Tanzania and a major investment of time and effort was needed to raise awareness regarding safeguards. Strong resistance to the concept of safeguards was expressed from some quarters of the NRTF during these early discussions. Following the recruitment of a national consultant and the development of a final list of principles, criteria and indicators, these discussions in Tanzania has evolved and matured significantly. There is now, among NRTF members, an acceptance of the importance of safeguards and a broad based consensus regarding the Tanzanian outputs to date, as well as consensus on moving forward to safeguard implementation. This increased acceptance of safeguards has been supported, by the Cancun and Durban COP decisions regarding safeguards. Ideally, safeguards should be used as both ex-ante as well as ex-post measures to screen or assess impacts. The REDD+ strategy was not subject to ex-ante screening of potential options as the safeguards were developed in parallel to, rather than before the national REDD+ strategy. Nevertheless, they can still be used to inform and guide on-going REDD+ readiness processes and most importantly REDD+ implementation phases. So, while no impacts have been realised through the adoption of safeguards, (just as REDD+ implementation has yet to take place, beyond individual pilot projects), the validity and necessity of the concept has been well internalised among decision makers in Tanzania, and a strong basis exists for moving forward with subsequent support to safeguard implementation.

6.5 Impact on monitoring, reporting and verification

The National REDD Policy Project has delivered negligible impact on MRV other than support to national consensus regarding the institutional home and function of NCMC. While

there has been a major effort on MRV, much of it supported by the Norwegian Embassy, the contribution of the REDD Policy Project has resulted in little impact to date. The design process for establishing the NCMC was undertaken through a contract administered by the Norwegian Embassy and outside of the National REDD Policy project budget. Important negotiations through the REDD+ Task Force have helped clarify and resolve the question of where and how the NCMC will be hosted, but since that time, the process has effectively stalled. As yet, Tanzania has no forest reference emission level or reference level and no functional MRV system, and much work is needed if these tasks are to be completed by 2016.

6.6 Impact on financing mechanism and benefit sharing

Given the limited progress achieved by the project in designing and establishing a financial mechanism, impact to date in this area has been negligible. Pilot projects have experimented with a range of different approaches to benefit sharing at the community level, including individual and group cash payments as well as other non-cash benefits. Exposure of NRTF members to these various approaches has resulted in openness from NRTF members to adopting a flexible and community-driven approach to sharing benefits within participating communities and groups. Less progress has been made on identifying how “vertical” benefit sharing will take place (between national and local actors), as no clear resolution has been made on financial modalities and mechanisms. Recent moves by MNRT to clarify how benefits from joint forest management will be shared between national, local government and local communities may provide some important impetus to these discussions. However, overall, impacts achieved by the project in this area are low.

6.7 Impact on participation of forest dependent communities and vulnerable groups

So far no direct negative or positive impacts on vulnerable groups have been seen as a result of the REDD Policy Project. The involvement of these groups has improved during the safeguards process. Ensuring that negative impacts on vulnerable groups are not realised is part of the safeguards process. The project focused on development of strategies and engaging in processes. Actual impacts in the field were not part of the project design. Consequently the project has had no direct positive or negative impacts on vulnerable groups. However, with eventual implementation of the REDD+ Strategy and REDD+ activities, impacts are expected. Since MTR, where it was found that there had been very limited attempt to reach out to groups that are known to be vulnerable, such as forest-dependent communities and indigenous peoples, the safeguards process has improved in this regard by including more representative of forest dependent communities and indigenous people in the consultations. The safeguards process so far has included indicators that is designed to ensure that REDD+ is undertaken with due recognition of the need for ensuring rights of forest-dependent communities and indigenous peoples.

The REDD+ Strategy has an intention of REDD+ benefitting local communities, however it also proposed actions that will be directly negative to marginalised pastoral societies. With regards to the REDD+ Strategy, it should be noted that negative impacts on marginalised groups might be promoted by implementation of the Strategy. This is especially with regards to the way that pastoral practises are viewed negatively in the Strategy and considered to be drivers of deforestation. Actions proposed in the Strategy include “destocking”, and promoting strategies that “reduce overgrazing and nomadic pastoralist strategies”. This would certainly impact negatively on vulnerable groups such as Indigenous Peoples including different pastoral communities with limited political voice. The safeguard process should take this into serious consideration in its further development.

7. Sustainability

7.1 Sustainability of institutional structures, processes and capacity developed

REDD+ Structures under the project, Secretariat, NRTF and TWGs, are currently not functional and Tanzania is still not REDD+-ready. The REDD Policy Project was responsible for the establishment of three, albeit temporary, structures namely the REDD+ Secretariat, NRTF and the TWGs. With the completion of this second phase of funding, none of these structures are currently functioning and all are unlikely to be sustained without external funding. The REDD+ Secretariat staff have all moved on in the absence of contracts and remuneration, whereas, the NRTF has ceased to meet since the Secretariat ended its facilitation of their activities. It goes without saying that the TWGs have not functioned since they remained the weakest structure under the project. Although, it was always recognized that these structures were not designed to be permanent, however neither has REDD+ readiness been accomplished yet and many stakeholders do not believe that the existing institutions are sufficiently resourced or capable to ensure readiness in Tanzania on their own. Two other structures that were meant to be permanent new institutions, namely the National Carbon Monitoring Centre (NCMC) and the REDD+ financing mechanism have not been established and yet their existence and functioning are conditions for Tanzania to benefit from any REDD+ funds internationally.

Functions of the NRTF must be aligned to the NCCSC and NCCTC. Fortunately, the chair of REDD+ Task Force, being the Director of Environment, is also the chair of National Climate Change Technical Committee and is the secretary to the National Climate Steering Committee. The DoE has expressed an interest in aligning these structures in order to eventually ensure sustainability of climate change processes, including REDD+. The NCCSC and NCCTC are structures provided for under the National Climate Change Strategy, which itself has received cabinet approval. Aligning to these structures would therefore anchor REDD+ activities within structures that have greater political legitimacy.

REDD+ Action Plans need extra effort in order to be mainstreamed in the ministries. Ensuring sustainability is a challenge as long as an international REDD+ agreement is not established and is not clear on its strategies. The action plans contained in the REDD+ strategy in and of themselves will not create sustainability. The action plans are necessary but are not sufficient to ensure sustainability. Significant additional efforts will be needed in order to integrate REDD+ actions into ministerial strategic plans and MTEF budgets. Although much time and effort was spent on drafting the exit strategy, Tanzania is still left with the situation where REDD+ activities are largely at a standstill at national level. However, it must be remembered that the REDD Policy Project has increased understanding of REDD+ processes and the capacity in the country to embark and continue on the readiness path has also increased. In addition, it is advisable to note that REDD+ negotiations specifically, and climate change more generally, continue to be dynamic and sometimes unpredictable in the international arena. This situation makes it difficult for GoT to commit to creating permanent sustainable structures when a clear picture of the end goal doesn't exist.

7.2 Sustainability of project outputs

An overall assessment of sustainability prospects is provided in the table below:

Project Outputs	Status in terms of Sustainability
Output 1: National REDD+ Secretariat Strengthened	The work of the Secretariat has increased prospects of sustainability of the REDD+ process in Tanzania specifically by facilitating important aspects of the readiness process.

	However, the Secretariat and its functions have not been properly prepared for other implementation modalities and not sufficiently handed over. Therefore sustainability of the Secretariat functions at this point in time is limited.
Output 2: Mechanisms to Coordinate, Implement and Monitor REDD+ processes strengthened	The continued function of the NRTF is still dependent on donor funding. As an institution, the NRTF has good prospects of being sustained in the remaining readiness phase either as part of the Climate Change Technical Committee or as a stand-alone task force. TWGs will not be sustained. Mainstreaming of the REDD+ Strategy into sectors has so far been limited and sustainability of this is limited. The project has invested a lot in COP participation to promote Tanzania positions on REDD+, but without additional project funding this is not likely to be to be sustained.
Output 3: Awareness & Outreach plan on REDD+ issues implemented	Awareness and consultation activities has led to increased awareness and participation in REDD+, and although the actual activities will not be sustained, awareness and participation will remain for some time, but will also depend on developments in the implementation of REDD+ activities.
Output 4: REDD+ Lessons Learning Network established & Information Management Strengthened	The knowledge and information sharing undertaken under this output have had lasting impacts on policies and positions and is in this respect are regarded as sustainable. The actual activities will however not be sustained. Sustainability can be threatened by discontinuation of documentation and information management activities.
Output 5: Social and Environmental Safeguard processes for REDD+ established and implemented	The progress achieved so far in the safeguards process will remain and will impact future safeguards process. The sustainability of this will depend on implementation of the remaining steps in the safeguards process and of actual implementation of REDD+ activities including payments from the international REDD+ agreement.
Output 6: National REDD+ Strategy Finalized & Action Plan prepared and implemented	The Strategy is a GoT-owned document that will be sustained but real sustainability will depend on actual implementation of the Strategy, which will follow the readiness phase and depend on the an international agreement on REDD+ and Tanzania's participation in such an international agreed framework.
Output 7: National Carbon Monitoring Centre and REDD+ Financing Mechanism developed and operational	The project-supported activities in terms of the NCMC have been limited, but opportunities remain that the NCMC will be established and sustained. If this does not happen, MRV activities are likely to be sustained through other channels and support mechanisms. In terms of financing mechanism, no sustainability has been created at this point and is not likely that a financing mechanism will be agreed and established before an international REDD+ agreement is in place.
Output 8: Engagement of Public, Private and Public-Private partnerships (programme developed)	Activities undertaken under this output on public-private partnership have focused on developing proposals for landscape REDD+ activities. They are not realistic proposals and are not likely to be funded. No sustainability has been achieved under this output.

7.3 Sustainability of key REDD+ readiness instruments

Limited progress on developing systems or structures for national MRV has meant that it is too early to talk conclusively about sustainability. However, the intention to embed MRV within a government-appointed institution (the NCMC) means that if the institution can be established, the prospects for sustainability appear to be good. A key aspect of this will revolve around the degree to which NCMC can generate its own funds from the monitoring and reporting aspects of its work. During the establishment phase, financial support will be provided from the Norwegian Embassy, but ultimately, the recurrent costs for this institution will have to be covered from national REDD+ financing, expected after 2016, or from the national budget. This is of course, dependent on the outcomes of global negotiations through UNFCCC, as well as progress Tanzania makes in establishing a functional financing mechanism.

National endorsement and ownership of the social and environmental safeguards produced has increased the chances of their long-term application and use. However, the degree to which they become sustainable in the medium to long term will depend upon costs associated with data collection and report compilation as well as the degree to which outcomes from safeguard monitoring are applied to policy changes and actions by government.

It is not possible to assess prospects for sustainability for the financial mechanism as no decision has been reached on its establishment or operational procedures.

7.4 Assessment of key outstanding issues to achieve REDD+ readiness

Significant gaps remain if Tanzania is to become REDD+-ready by 2016 and qualify for funding under a global agreement on REDD+. The recently published methodological guidance (December 2013) from the FCPF Carbon Fund provides an up-to-date picture of the requirements of countries that are seeking to qualify for payments from the Carbon Fund and as such gives an accurate indication of where Tanzania should aim for, if it is to qualify for international performance based REDD+ funding in the future.

- **MRV and carbon baseline.** Tanzania must have an operational MRV system in place, which will include a Forest Reference Emission Level or Forest Reference Level, against which subsequent emission reduction (ER) changes can be benchmarked and assessed. This will include procedures for carbon accounting and registration. MRV will have to take account of leakage and reversals (non-permanence), as well as the latest methodological guidance from UNFCCC. While significant efforts have been made recently to develop different models and approaches to MRV, including community level, project level and national level approaches, NAFORMA and other methods, no clear consensus has been reached at national level regarding how national level MRV and baseline assessments will take place. NCMC, once established, will have to take the lead in these activities, including operational procedures for obtaining reliable data, communicating and transmitting data to the designated national authority DNA, as well as to the wider public. Clearly, much work is needed to agree methods and approaches, and to compile and synthesise different sources of data.
- **Safeguards and safeguard information system:** Safeguards will need to be operationalized and a safeguard information system established in compliance with UNFCCC decisions. A clear monitoring plan will have to be developed, and data collected and compiled to report against selected indicators. These will have to be compiled into a national report and made publicly available. Where safeguards are triggered, remedial action will be required from government to ensure future impacts are mitigated. Procedures for subsequent safeguard monitoring will need to be agreed and responsibilities clearly apportioned and agreed. This should include wide participation from both government and non-governmental actors. If Tanzania is to qualify for performance-based funding under FCPF Carbon Fund, screening of plans for reducing emissions (addressing drivers) and sharing of benefits will have to be subjected to World Bank safeguard

review processes, such as SESA and ESMF². In order to guide and anchor this process, it is proposed that the technical working group on Legal, Governance and Safeguards be re-activated as a specific consultative group for the process and provided with a clear mandate from the NRTF. Where possible, its membership should be broadened to include a broader cross-section of stakeholders (such as forest-dependent communities).

- **REDD+ financing and benefit sharing.** A mechanism will have to be established for receiving international REDD+ financing and disbursing these funds in support of measures to address deforestation drivers. Associated with this will be a rational approach to sharing carbon (i.e. financial) and non-carbon benefits between different stakeholders. This will require a benefit sharing plan that defines the rationale and mechanism for sharing of benefits. Associated with this will be a clear plan for how deforestation drivers will be prioritised and addressed and the mechanism for doing this. This might include sector-based investments as indicated in the action plan of the National REDD+ Strategy, or it could be other forms of incentives for local level forest managers or custodians.

Practical options for moving forward with each of these areas are explored more in section 9 of this report.

7.5 Assessment of future risks and challenges in the REDD+ readiness process

The future REDD+ readiness process and the support to this process is challenging and involves a number of risks, which the review team has attempted to map. They are presented below:

- A major risk is that there will be no international REDD+ agreement. This will jeopardize interest and engagement in REDD+ and any further implementation of REDD+ activities. The review team acknowledge that REDD+ is a contributor to sustainable development, but do not think that it will get sufficient buy-in in a situation where there is no international agreement and therefore no funding of REDD+ activities. There are simply too many other priority agendas, which will be prioritized in its place. The chances of the risk materialising is considered to be medium, but have reduced somewhat following positive discussions at the Warsaw COP. Measures to reduce this risk is really not within the reach of a REDD+ readiness process in Tanzania.
- A related risk is the risk that the international REDD+ architecture will continue to change and be inconclusive in several years to come. This will also impact the interest in the REDD+ process negatively and will therefore also impact negatively on Tanzania's REDD+ readiness. Like the above risk, it is considered to be medium and with little that can be done in Tanzania to mitigate it.
- With the NCMC having been under discussion for a long time, and with the various stakeholders still not able to get a MOU on the establishment, the review team finds that there is a risk that the way forward for NCMC establishment will remain unclear for a long time and that a MOU between VPO and SUA will not materialize. A prolonged and exhaustive process of establishing the executive agency may take away time and energy of key stakeholders from development of both an MRV and a carbon baseline. This risk is considered to be medium and it will certainly impact key areas needed in the readiness process. Mitigating the risk would be to seek ways of

² SESA is the assessment process that combines analytical work and consultation in an iterative fashion to inform the preparation of the national REDD+ strategy. The Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF) is an output of SESA that provides a framework to examine the issues and impacts associated with projects, activities, policies and/or regulations that may occur in the future in connection with the implementation of the national REDD+ strategy, but that are not known at the present time.

supporting some of the key aspects of MRV before the MOU on NCMC establishment materializes.

- The role of facilitating the further readiness process is the mandate of VPO. Support for this is likely to be channelled through VPO, however, there is a risk of VPO is not able to deliver effectively on its mandate of facilitating the REDD+ readiness process. The challenge is that by anchoring the functions of the Secretariat in the VPO, a government ministry, it raises the risk of lowering efficiency by introducing more bureaucracy and greater delays in decision making. This will have a negative impact on the further facilitation of the REDD+ readiness process. It is also considered a challenge that VPO staff may not have the capacity to conclude and manage outsourced contracts for developing MRV and other REDD+ specific outputs. The risk is considered to be medium to high. Measures to counter this risk will include ensuring focused support, which includes capacity to strengthen the implementation of the project-supported activities, and which ensures streamlined decision-making in the planned activities and ensuring that some outputs are effectively outsourced to service providers.
- For implementation of REDD+ actions there is need for institutional collaboration and coordination among key sectors ministries. Key among these is the collaboration between VPO and MNRT. There is a risk that institutional barriers and especially institutional conflict between VPO and MNRT will hamper implementation of REDD+ processes. This risk is considered to be medium. To mitigate the risk there is need for clearly recognising in future support the role of VPO as the key coordinator and MNRT as the key implementer of REDD+ activities. Clear distinction of roles and responsibilities will be needed.
- With MNRT as the key institution for REDD+ implementation and with sustainable forest management under the PFM programme as a key modality for REDD+ implementation it is important that TFS and MNRT are clear in their commitment to PFM. Lack of clarity on the institutional home for PFM within MNRT, and lack of linkages between PFM and REDD+ advocates in MNRT constitutes a risk for actual REDD+ implementation. The risk is considered to be medium. Mitigating measures include recognising the key role that PFM will play in REDD+ implementation and ensuring that REDD+ investments are supportive of PFM implementation.
- The review team finds that there is a risk that collecting, compiling and reporting on safeguards is found to be prohibitively expensive, complex and difficult to implement. Safeguards remain a complex and difficult concept for many stakeholders who will be required to link a rationalized set of indicators with existing monitoring systems, regulations and institutions. The risk is considered to be medium to high. Mitigating measures include supporting a further safeguards development process, where focus is put on practical implementation and execution of the safeguards system, and ensuring that number of indicators to be reported on is limited and realistic to collect.
- Related to the above risk, is the risk that the transaction costs of establishing and maintaining REDD+-specific institutions are prohibitively high and exceed revenue. This risk will impact the sustainability of the involvement of Tanzania in a REDD+ agreement. With unknown revenues to Tanzania in a REDD+ agreement and with unknown cost of operating the REDD+-specific institutions it is difficult to gauge how serious the risk is. This risk is considered medium to high. Mitigating measures include ensuring that costs are realistically estimated and ensuring that future national REDD+ revenue scenarios are developed.
- NAFORMA data provides a key contribution to REDD+ MRV. There is a risk that NAFORMA operation after June 2014 is not sustained. This will have a major negative impact on REDD+

readiness in Tanzania. The risk is considered to be medium to high. The lack of sustainability of NAFORMA can be countered by TFS commitment to continue the running of NAFORMA and also partly by NCMC being established and engaging in direct utilisation of NAFORMA data.

- With the actual implementation of REDD+, actions in terms of management of forest in a sustainable way will be needed. Some of these actions proposed by various stakeholders include denying marginalised groups within or from outside villages access to forest areas. Some of these proposed actions are mainly based on traditional conservation thinking rather than on sound management of forest areas. There is a risk that REDD+ implementation will mean that already marginalised groups will loose out and their livelihoods will be undermined. The risk is considered to be medium to high. Mitigating measures involve a strong implementation of the Safeguards system with strong linkages to public disclosure of impacts on different target groups.

8. Lessons learned

Many useful lessons have been learned from the two phases of support to the National REDD+ policy process. The end-of-project review has managed to describe some of the lessons learnt, but the five-years two-phases of support have generated more lessons learned than was possible to collect and analyse during the review. IUCN have compiled some useful lessons from the IUCN-implemented lessons learning and knowledge management assignment, while other lessons have been compiled by Tanzania Forest Conservation Group (TFCG) and TNRF on thematic issues such as safeguards, benefit sharing and gender. However, there have been few comprehensive efforts to compile lessons from a national perspective and across the REDD+-readiness process. A number of key areas have emerged that could form the basis of a more substantial review of lessons learned. These are summarised below in brief:

- **Lessons on building ownership around new and complex strategies such as REDD+.** This includes lessons from the establishment of an independent secretariat outside line ministries and how this helped reduce conflicts between VPO and MNRT by providing a neutral facilitator, as well as the role of the task force in building government ownership of REDD+ and the national REDD+ strategy. In addition assumptions were made at the outset that there would be strong engagement and ownership within government towards REDD+ given its potential role in sustainable development and potential financial flows. However, a more cautious approach has been expressed by government who have adopted a “wait and see” position in some areas, until more substantial progress has been achieved on reaching an international REDD+ agreement.
- **Lessons on creating practice to policy linkages in pilot projects.** This includes lessons on how to facilitate a conducive environment that allows for the flow of lessons and experiences between pilot projects and between projects and emerging national policy processes. Lessons can also be usefully learned around what measures are needed to foster innovation and learning, while ensuring that projects operate within and under a common framework.
- **Lessons on engaging with non-governmental stakeholders** (civil society and private sector). This includes how NGOs and private sector organisations can be engaged in emerging debates, discussions and policy development processes, while maintaining governmental leadership and ownership.
- **Lessons on communication and awareness.** This includes the use of specialist service providers, and the need to undertake on-going monitoring of the effectiveness and efficiency of different approaches, channels and methods. It could also include lessons on how to maintain

creativity and innovation in communication work while ensuring governmental control and ownership. Furthermore, many important lessons have been learned about how despite major efforts to ensure that a balanced message is communicated around REDD+ (sustainable development, sustainable forest management etc.), politicians, journalists and other stakeholders have chosen to focus on aspects such as financial benefits and environmental protection / conservation.

- **Lessons on mainstreaming.** Mainstreaming is a somewhat vague term understood in different ways by different people. Assumptions made that involving one or two people from sectors such as agriculture or energy and then expecting that they would go back to their respective line ministries and integrate REDD+ actions within existing plans and budgets were over ambitious and simplistic. Clearly a much greater investment (time, resources) is needed to ensure that plans and budgets are loaded with REDD+ actions and that any sector-level REDD+ activities and expenditures are then tracked, recorded and attributed. Initial progress on mainstreaming may be made in sectors where REDD+ actions are likely to match with existing planned investments. This is most likely within the forest sector, by making linkages to existing planned investments in community based forest management and sustainable forest management more generally.
- **Lessons on consultation.** Consulting stakeholders, particularly at local levels, about REDD+ has been made difficult by the complex and evolving nature of REDD+. Before people can be expected to provide any clear position or views on REDD+ it is important to explain what REDD+ is and how it may impact (positively or negatively) on households and forest dependent communities. Similar lessons have been learned from consultations around safeguards. Discussions are somewhat abstract and hypothetical and as such demanding, time-consuming and attract additional costs.
- **Lessons on fostering linkages between research, practice and policy.** This includes how practical measures can be taken to increase the likelihood of research feeding into and informing practice and policy, including timing issues, communication measures and capacity building measures to support dissemination.

9. Conclusions of end-of-project review

The REDD Policy Project has ensured that the REDD+ readiness goal is in the process of being achieved. Overall the REDD Policy Project has helped Tanzania move towards REDD+ readiness and as such has ensured that Tanzania is now in a better position to benefit from possible global funding opportunities for REDD+. In order for Tanzania to be fully REDD+-ready, there are still key areas that need to be focused on and further developed.

The REDD Policy Project is of high relevance, but it has been a demanding policy process to facilitate. Overall the project design is found to be clearly relevant and designed to contribute to the REDD+ readiness process in Tanzania and in accordance with the emerging UNFCCC decisions on REDD+ and Tanzania's own climate change strategy. The various aspects supported in the readiness process are relevant. However, the ability of the REDD+ process to promote broader goals of sustainable development and address multiple drivers of deforestation is limited. Some of the project outputs have been too ambitious and do not reflect the realities of moving forward with a complex and still undefined process such as REDD+ in Tanzania. Delivery of these outputs depends on longer and more complex government reforms and decision-making than was initially anticipated.

Strengthening of the REDD+ Secretariat was achieved and it played an important facilitation role in guiding the REDD+ process at national level. The project has supported the running and

strengthening of the REDD+ Secretariat hosted by IRA. The Secretariat has played an important facilitation role. Challenges have been faced with balancing external facilitation with GoT decision-making and ownership, but overall the Secretariat has handled the job relatively well. Many outputs have been produced with the facilitation of the Secretariat, but strategic oversight and guidance have been limited and it has been a challenge to ensure overall direction in REDD+ process. The continuity and handing over of the secretariat facilitation has been limited and no secretariat exists as yet within the VPO that is capable of carrying the REDD+ process forward.

Coordination mechanisms for REDD+ processes have been strengthened, the REDD+ Strategy has been finalised, and broadened ownership to the REDD+ process has been created among selected stakeholders. The National REDD+ Strategy has been drafted, consulted, finalised and approved, though a broad-based and consultative process, and as such represents a major achievement of the project. Mainstreaming of the REDD+ Strategy across different sectors is a challenge and will be most directly possible within the forestry sector under the participatory forest management programme. The NRTF was expanded and this has broadened ownership of REDD+ across government. The NRTF has played a central role in the REDD+ process and in guiding the REDD+ policy process. TWGs have not been effective and linkages between the NRTF and the official Tanzania delegation and negotiators prior to, and after, COP meetings have been poor. Linkages and diffusion from representatives of sector ministries back to their respective parent ministries has been weak and additional work will be needed if mainstreaming is to take place effectively.

Linkages have been good with REDD+ pilot projects but have generally been poor with other REDD+ projects and initiatives. Linkages between the National REDD Policy Project and other Norwegian support to REDD+ activities in Tanzania have been variable with good linkages to the supported pilot projects and with poor linkages to the research projects. Linkages to the UN-REDD programme in Tanzania and with FCPF have overall been limited. Tanzania's official position regarding FCPF remains unclear. Overall co-ordination and integration of REDD+ and climate change support among bilateral and multi-lateral donors to Tanzania have been weak.

Consultation and awareness activities have been handled well but also with limitations in terms of focus in messages and monitoring of impacts. Consultation and awareness activities have been well implemented and delivered according to agreed targets and as a result national awareness of REDD+ has increased. Consultations undertaken across the country have improved the quality and ownership of the National REDD+ Strategy. The rather general nature of climate change and environmental conservation messages being promoted has limited effectiveness of the activities. Monitoring of consultation and awareness impacts has been limited and strategic development of awareness tools have not been fully realised.

The social and environmental safeguards process represents an important milestone in the readiness process but will need additional support to be fully operationalized. National REDD+ Safeguards have been produced and approved, with an increasing ownership and understanding of safeguards processes at different levels. Major work is still required on establishing a functional safeguard information system, capable of informing the policy processes in the REDD+ readiness as well as REDD+ implementation. Selective use of safeguards may impact Tanzania's eligibility under the FCPF/Carbon Fund.

MRV and NCMC have been supported but the timing of NCMC's establishment is at this point unclear. REDD+ financing mechanisms are not yet agreed upon. A consensus has been reached regarding the hosting and functions of the National Carbon Monitoring Centre and proposals regarding its costs, financing, staffing and role are agreed. Recent progress in establishing NCMC at SUA has stalled following protracted negotiations between Vice Presidents Office and Presidents

Office-Public Service Management (PO-PSM). It is unclear when or how these negotiations will end. Very limited progress has been made in terms of agreeing on a REDD+ financing mechanism, largely due to factors beyond the control of the project, namely the uncertainty over the level of future REDD+ financing as well as on-going national level discussions between VPO, Ministry of Finance and development partners regarding options for financing of climate change activities.

The overall assessment of the project is that while it provided valuable support to the REDD+ readiness process, it only partially provided value for money. Project staff have performed well, but project management has been of variable quality and operated with relatively low levels of efficiency. Total expenditures of the project to support national REDD+ readiness are considered to be high, whereas the efficiency in policy support processes has been relatively limited and impacted negatively by an open-ended policy process with no clear prioritisation and deadlines and no international agreed frameworks to work within. There does appear to be a generic trade off between cost efficiency and ownership in policy projects such as these. The overall assessment of efficiency is mixed, with some outputs on coordination, on awareness & outreach, on safeguards, and on national REDD+ Strategy demonstrating relative good value for money, but with others, providing less value for money.

The project has created sustainable impacts but for the readiness process to be completed additional support will be needed. Many of the structures established under the project (such as the REDD+ Secretariat and NRTF) are designed to deliver elements of REDD+ readiness and are by their nature not meant to be sustainable entities. Additional donor funding support will be needed to continue development of key readiness “building blocks” if they are to be functional and sustainable entities. Key outstanding issues are further work on MRV and carbon baselines, the work on safeguards and safeguards information system, as well as the work on REDD+ financing and benefit sharing.

A number of key risks for the REDD+ readiness process have been identified. There are a number of key risks associated with the future REDD+ process, that include: the lack of international agreement on REDD+; the lack of progress with regards to establishment of NCMC as an independent institution; The challenges in terms of delivery in the readiness process within a structure under VPO; institutional barriers between ministries and sectors; the lack of focus on participatory forest management within MNRT as a primary strategy for sustainable forest management; and that the high transaction cost of establishing and maintaining REDD+-specific institutions.

Key recommendations from the end-of-project review have been developed to guide the further development of REDD+ readiness in Tanzania. Based on progress to date, as well as lessons learned in project implementation a number of key recommendations are provided. They include: Support the continued REDD+ readiness process and its coordination through a secretariat anchored in VPO and with continued involvement of NRTF; support the finalization of the social and environmental safeguards process; focus the support to the REDD+ process to a limited number of deliverables and ensure deadlines and milestones; focus future mainstreaming efforts primarily within the forestry sector under the existing participatory forest management programme; provide interim support to MRV while waiting for decisions on NCMC establishment; await further support to the REDD+ financial mechanism process, pending greater clarity at both the national and international levels regarding REDD+ and climate change financing.

10. Recommendations on future support in the REDD+ process

1. Recommendation for continued support to readiness process and secretariat functions: In order to sustain the further readiness process in Tanzania, support should be provided to VPO, which has the legal and institutional mandate to lead and coordinate REDD+ issues. The support should include focused facilitation of REDD+ processes through an efficient, compact unit, which will assume the functions of the REDD+ Secretariat and be anchored in the VPO. The focussed support to a unit within the VPO will help spearhead continued development of the remaining key building blocks of REDD+, such as MRV, NCMC, Safeguards and Financing. The support should be temporary during the remaining REDD+ readiness phase up to 2016. Outsourcing should continue as a strategy to provide additional external input to the readiness process with regard to MRV and safeguard monitoring. Previous development assistance to the environment sector, channelled through VPO has been subject to significant delay and poor performance. As such, it will be important to learn from these lessons by ensuring that a small team of dedicated staff are provided to VPO dedicated to REDD+ co-ordination by adopting the REDD+ secretariat model adopted in earlier phases of REDD+ support to IRA. Rather than 7 staff, a smaller team of 2-3 staff would appear more practical and cost-effective. Where possible, staff formerly working in the IRA REDD+ Secretariat could be encouraged to take up positions within this new secretariat to ensure continuity and to avoid loss of existing capacity. In addition, strong leadership and autonomy in decision making will be needed for the director of the VPO REDD+ Secretariat to ensure that actions are not unduly delayed.

2. Recommendation for coordination mechanisms: VPO should be recognized as the host agency for REDD+ policy support and this office should be supported to continue providing coordination, information sharing, and leadership, just as long as they do so in an open and participatory manner. Furthermore, linkages with NCCSC, NCCTC and COP delegations need to be strengthened ahead of an eventual institutional merger. Support to NRTF should be continued. There is a need to ensure broader cross-stakeholder co-ordination with regard to the work on safeguards and it is proposed that the TWG on legal, governance and safeguards should be broadened and given a stronger mandate to support the operationalization of safeguards. Otherwise, support to TWGs should be discontinued as no additional value is observed.

3. Recommendation for future consultations and awareness creation: Future support to REDD+ readiness in Tanzania should only have limited awareness and information activities for selected stakeholders on specific focus areas. Such activities should be tied to specific outputs and with targeted audience (such as safeguards communication, benefit sharing options, monitoring and reporting, and investment in sustainable forest management). Further support should ensure that continuous monitoring of awareness, information and consultation activities is built into any project design and that project implementation is not mechanistically following a predetermined plan, but is developed in dialogue with monitoring of real time impacts of the said activities.

4. Recommendation for lessons learning: Future support to analysing and disseminating REDD+ messages and lessons learned should be focused on using the website and other useful, relevant web based platforms, which involve learning networks and other fora. More focus should be placed on self-sustaining learning networks, which require little funding to support and includes a community of practitioners. Urgent efforts should be made to sustain the website before the May 2014 deadline is reached. Outstanding documents should be uploaded onto the website immediately and actors of the Lessons Learning Network should develop a sustainability protocol.

5. Recommendation for finalization of social and environmental safeguards: Subsequent support should be provided, through an outsourced service provider, to the safeguard process to complete the operationalization of the safeguards and the establishment of a functional safeguard information system. Work still to be done includes the development of a monitoring plan, a national monitoring report, agreeing and implementing procedures for disclosure and communication of

findings, and taking mitigating action when safeguards are triggered. As mentioned earlier, the TWG on legal, governance and safeguards will need overhauling to ensure it can play a more substantial role in co-ordinating the operationalization process.

6. Recommendation for focus in readiness process and mainstreaming the REDD+ Strategy:

Focus the support on a limited number of deliverables needed to complete the readiness process, and ensure a limit to the use of funds for open-ended REDD+ process support. In order to promote efficiency in policy support processes it is important to ensure clear targets and deadlines. Future support should better link release of funding to results and deliverable.

7. Recommendation on sector focus in future REDD+ investments: Direct mainstreaming efforts to ensure a focus on the key subject matter of supporting sustainable forest management and especially participatory forest management in the future support to the REDD+ process. Consider the allocation of funding towards targeted investments within MNRT in support of community based forest management and other measures to promote sustainable forest management and the protocols to link MNRT and future REDD+ institutions. Addressing the various drivers of deforestation within multiple sectors should be limited to provision of REDD+ related input to strategic sector policy development.

8. Recommendation on NCMC and MRV: Provide interim financial support to SUA (perhaps linked with the existing MRV project) to develop a national reference emission level/forest reference level for Tanzania, while supporting through outsourced service providers for stakeholders to develop supplementary elements of a possible MRV system. In the meantime monitor progress in the discussions between VPO and PO-PSM on NCMC until their conclusion. MRV must conform to the most current UNFCCC methodological guidance, include carbon accounting systems and account for leakage as well as reversals. Efforts should be focused on using existing data sources and MRV information.

9. Recommendation on financial mechanism and linkages to FCPF and Carbon Fund: No additional financial resources should be committed to pursuing design of the financial mechanism until discussions between government and development partners on broader climate financing mechanisms have been concluded satisfactorily, and a clearer understanding of international requirements for the receipt of REDD+ finances (such as the Carbon Fund) are known. It will be important to clarify Tanzania's position with the FCPF.

10. Recommendations for monitoring Public-Private Partnerships proposals: No additional funding should be allocated to these proposals in future REDD+ support from RNE.

Annex 1 Actual expenditures for each output compared to budget

Actual expenditures for each output compared to budget

Project Outputs	Budget	Expenditures per end of project (round figures)
Output 1: National REDD+ Secretariat Strengthened (including IRA institutional overhead and contingency used for staff)	1,438,038	1,427,000
Output 2: Mechanisms to Coordinate, Implement and Monitor REDD+ processes strengthened	664,920	588,000
Output 3: Awareness & Outreach plan on REDD+ issues implemented	400,000	299,000
Output 4: REDD+ Lessons Learning Network established & Information Management Strengthened	200,000	119,000
Output 5: Social and Environmental Safeguard processes for REDD+ established and implemented	400,000	328,000
Output 6: National REDD+ Strategy Finalized & Action Plan prepared and implemented	486,260	490,000
Output 7: National Carbon Monitoring Centre and REDD+ Financing Mechanism developed and operational	98,000	27,000
Output 8: Engagement of Public, Private and Public-Private partnerships (programme developed)	203,400	61,000
Total	3,890,618	3,339,000

Annex 2 Itinerary of the end-of-project review

Date	Time	Activity
Wednesday 8th January	10.00 am	Briefing meeting with Royal Norwegian Embassy
Thursday 9th January	8.30 am	Meeting with Magdalena Banasiak, DFID
	11.00 am	Meeting with Soren Dalsgaard, NAFORMA
	Afternoon	Travel to Kilosa
Friday 10th January	09.00-14.00:	Meetings with Kilosa District Staff and TFCG/Mjumita pilot project staff
	14.00-18.00	Field visit to Nyali village, Kilosa District
		Sleep Kilosa
Saturday 11th January	All day	Meetings SUA with NCMC, MRV Research Project, and CCIAM Programme
		Sleep Morogoro
Sunday 12th January	Morning	Travel back from Morogoro
	Afternoon:	Team meeting
Monday 13th January	Morning	Team meeting
	13.00	IRA, Faustin Maganga Institute of Resource Assessment,
	15.00	REDD+ Secretariat former staff
Tuesday 14th January	10.00	Dr. Ningu, Director of Environment. VPO
	14.00	Abdallah Shah, IUCN Country Office
Wednesday 15th January	9.00 am	Geoffrey Mwanjela, WWF Country Office
	11.00 am	Regalia Media
	13.30	Joseph Kigula, Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism
Thursday 16th January	10.00-14.00	Workshop with NRTF and TWGs, VPO
	16.00	Prof Yanda and REDD+ Secretariat staff, IRA
Friday 17th January	9.00 am	Mjumita and TFCG
	14.00	AJ Glauber, World Bank
Saturday 18th January	Morning	Team meeting, findings and conclusions
	16.00	Jema Ngwale, Danish Embassy
Sunday 19th January	Report writing	
Monday 20th January	Morning	Team meeting to prepare presentation
	13.00-15.30	Debriefing at Norwegian Embassy

Annex 3 List of persons met

Persons met / consulted

Name	Position	Institution
Berit Tvete	Counsellor, Environment and Climate Change	Embassy of Norway
Mille Lund	Consultant, Environment & Climate Change team	Embassy of Norway
Yassin Mkwizu	Programme Officer, Environment and Climate Change	Embassy of Norway
Pius Yanda	Co-ordinator, REDD+ Secretariat	Institute of Resource Assessment
Faustin Maganga	Deputy Director, IRA	Institute of Resource Assessment
Emma Liwenga	Deputy Co-ordinator, REDD+ Secretariat	Institute of Resource Assessment
Edmund Mabhuye	Programme Officer, REDD+ Secretariat	Institute of Resource Assessment
Faustine Ninga	Programme Officer, REDD+ Secretariat	Institute of Resource Assessment
Shukuru Nyagawa	Communications and outreach officer, REDD+ Secretariat	Institute of Resource Assessment
Geofrey Mwanjela	Programme Co-ordinator	Worldwide Fund for Nature
JemaNgwale	Programme Officer, Environment	Embassy of Denmark
Magdalena Banasiak	Climate Change Adviser	Department for International Development, (UK), Tanzania
Ann JeaneteGlauber	Senior Environmental Specialist	World Bank, Tanzania
Amy Faust	Environmental Specialist	World Bank, Tanzania
Lyatura Njabha	Programme Manager	Regalia Media
Secelela Balisidya	Director	Regalia Media
Soren Dalsgaard	CTA - NAFORMA	Tanzania Forest Service / FAO
Abdallah Shah	Head – IUCN Tanzania Office	International Union for the Conservation of Nature
Steve Ball	Technical Adviser	Mpingo Conservation and Development Initiative
Julius Ningu	Director of Environment (and NRTF Chair)	Vice Presidents Office
George Kafumu	Environment Officer (and NRTF Member)	Vice Presidents Office, Environment Division
Evarest Nashanda	Senior Forest Officer	Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism
Edwin Nsokko	Senior Forest Officer (TWG – MRV member)	Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism
Joseph Kigula	PFM Programme Co-ordinator	Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism
Charles Meshack	Director (and NRTF Member)	Tanzania Forest Conservation Group
Rahima Njaidi	Director (TWG – Legal, Governance and Safeguards member)	MJUMITA
Yonika Ngaga	Dean, Faculty of Forestry	Sokoine University of

		Agriculture
Emmanuel Luoga	Head, MRV Project	Sokoine University of Agriculture
EliakimuZahabu	Assistant Head, MRV Project (TWG – MRV member)	Sokoine University of Agriculture
Salim Moliondo	Co-ordinator, CCIAM Programme	Sokoine University of Agriculture
Dos Santos Silayo	Forest Engineer	Sokoine University of Agriculture
Rogers Malimbwi	Inventory Specialist	Sokoine University of Agriculture
George Mwamengele	Assistant Programme Coordinator, CCIAM	Sokoine University of Agriculture
Fares Mahuha	Assistant Director, Agricultural Land Use Planning and Management (and NRTF Member)	Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security
Joseph Gari	Africa Co-ordinator	UN-REDD, Nairobi
Phil Franks	Global Co-ordinator, REDD Social and Environmental Standards Initiative	IIED, London, UK
Prosper Makunyi	Environmental Management Officer, Environmental Management Unit	Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security
Daniel Ngari	Deputy Director of Finance and Administration	University of Dar es Salaam
Ralf Ernst	Programme Co-ordinator (former)	UN-REDD Tanzania
Shadrack Minja	Agricultural Extension Officer, Kilosa	TFCG
Wilfred Pima	Project Field Co-ordinator, Kilosa	MJUMITA
Abraham Mushashu	District Agricultural Officer	Kilosa District Council
Othmar Haule	District Natural Resources Officer	Kilosa District Council
Grace Chogome	Community Development Officer	Kilosa District Council
Martin Kapinga	Community Development Officer	Kilosa District Council
Bitabonwa Mukama	Assistant Lands Officer	Kilosa District Council
Salim Maudia	Agricultural Officer	Kilosa District Council
Sebastian Maliwa	District Forest Officer	Kilosa District Council
Steven Magembe	Agricultural Officer	Kilosa District Council
Abel Mchome		Kilosa District Council
Eliakim Enos	Project Officer	TFCG

Annex 4 Actions taken on mid-term review recommendations

MTR recommendations for remainder of the 2nd phase project	Status of actions taken on recommendations
Prioritise activities in relation to Output 2 (facilitating the NRTF and TWG), Outputs 3, 4 and 5 (as per contract) and Output 7 (facilitating discussion around REDD+ financing modalities).	NRTF and coordination have been facilitated in response to output 2. TWGs not operationalized. All outputs 3,4,5 has been finalised as per contract, and some actions have been taken with regards to output 7.
In collaboration with UN-REDD, develop a road map for mainstreaming REDD+ within sector ministries.	This has not been done. Mainstreaming is generally described in the action plans for the REDD+ Strategy.
Finalise awareness activities as agreed. Seek to monitor impact and ensure that lessons learned are documented.	Activities finalised as agreed, lessons with regards to awareness and information activities documented. Impacts only monitored to a limited extent.
Focus efforts on the compilation and synthesis of lessons learned across REDD+ experiences in Tanzania, including pilot projects and research, as well as other documentation exercises.	Lessons learned remain scattered at the respective field, research, or policy levels. Compilation and synthesis of lessons learned has not been undertaken. Efforts have not been focused.
Clarify Tanzania's official position with FCPF and if necessary, ensure full compliance with World Bank safeguard and operational policies (SESA) to qualify for future financing under the Carbon Fund.	Tanzania is a FCPF member. Compliance with World Bank safeguards and operational policies has not be achieved in the safeguards process and an official GoT position on this is not available. The safeguards process did not include SESA.
Engage the backstopping consultant to link more directly with on-going discussions on climate financing and identify opportunities for the development of a REDD+ "window."	This has not been done, rather than linking more directly to the on-going discussions on climate financing, a further study was commissioned, which has not been able to clarify and mover forward the process for establishing a financial mechanism for REDD+.
MTR recommendations intended for the first year following the 2nd phase	Status of actions taken on recommendations
No strong justification can be made for a "business as usual" no-cost extension after end September 2013. Instead, a 12 month period of targeted project support (October 2013 – September 2014) with concrete deliverables and activities focused around support to i) safeguards, ii) benefit sharing, iii) financial mechanisms iv) tree/carbon tenure rights and v) mainstreaming of REDD+ actions in line ministries.	This 12-month period of targeted project support has not and will not be undertaken with IRA. Preparations for providing targeted support through VPO DOE are being considered. Activities have all terminated at 30 th September 2013, with major issues of sustainability and follow up to several of the outputs.
Specific TORs should be developed for Service Providers to support safeguard implementation, development of benefit sharing modalities, legal	This has not been done. This will be part of the follow up support to readiness process.

resolution of carbon rights/ tree tenure and design of financial mechanisms.	
IRA could under a more focused, reduced and well defined contract lead the activity around mainstreaming of REDD+ actions in line ministries, as well as to continue to facilitate the activities of the NRTF and TWG where needed. IRA could also act as contract manager for the three outsourced activities	Not done. Discussions on-going between NRE and VPO on possible support. The end-review has provided input to defining the support needed for the further readiness process.